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Abstract 
What is the optimal form of firm organization during “bad times”? Using two large micro datasets on 
firm decentralization from US administrative data and 10 OECD countries, we find that firms that 
delegated more power from the Central Headquarters to local plant managers prior to the Great 
Recession out-performed their centralized counterparts in sectors that were hardest hit by the 
subsequent crisis. We present a model where higher turbulence benefits decentralized firms because 
the value of local information and urgent action increases. Since turbulence rises in severe downturns, 
decentralized firms do relatively better. We show that the data support our model over alternative 
explanations such as recession-induced reduction in agency costs (due to managerial fears of 
bankruptcy) and changing coordination costs. Countries with more decentralized firms (like the US) 
weathered the 2008-09 Great Recession better: these organizational differences could account for 
about 16% of international differences in post-crisis GDP growth. 
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1 Introduction
What makes firms more resilient to large negative macro shocks? A recent literature has focused on
firms’ technological, financial and governance structures as possible factors a↵ecting their ability to
cope with sudden changes in external conditions1, but much less is known about the role of firm or-
ganization. This paper focuses on how a specific organizational aspect of a firm, the extent to which
decision-making is decentralized down from headquarters to plant managers, a↵ects performance
during an economic crisis. This has particular relevance following the Great Recession of 2009-08,
which generated a debate over how best to organize for “recovery and survival”. One common
argument (the “Tsarist view”) is that centralized firms were best equipped to survive the recession
because of the importance of cost cutting which, due to conflicting interests within the firm, is best
directed from corporate headquarters. An alternative, “Localist view” is that recessions are periods
of rapid change, and being decentralized provides firms with the necessary flexibility to respond to
turbulent business conditions.2
To investigate these issues, we created two new panel datasets with explicit measures of decen-
tralization measured prior to the Great Recession. One dataset, the World Management Survey
(WMS) has firm level data across ten OECD countries (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan,
Poland, Portugal Sweden, the UK and US). The other dataset, the Management and Organiza-
tional Practices Survey (MOPS), we constructed in partnership with the Census Bureau and covers
US plants. We combine these datasets with firm and plant performance data before and after the
2009-08 crisis.
We find compelling evidence that, in sectors that were exogenously hit harder by the crisis,
decentralized firms outperformed their centralized rivals in terms of survival chances as well as in
their growth of sales, productivity and profits. We use several measures of the shock, including
changes in trade patterns (export in an establishment’s industry by country cell) and a pre-recession
measure of product durability to measure the shock (durable goods industries su↵er more in re-
cessions as consumers can postpone purchases). Our findings are robust to placebo tests, a wide
range of controls, and an IV strategy exploiting the fact that generalized trust around the plant’s
headquarters predicts whether a firm decentralizes (see Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012).
In order to understand the stylized fact that decentralized firms do relatively better in “bad
times”, we develop a model of firm decision-making building on the Aghion and Tirole (1997) ap-
1For example, see Aghion, Askenazy, Berman, Cette, and Eymard (2012) on technology; Chodorow-Reich (2014)
on financial structure and Alfaro and Chen (2012) or D’Aurizio, Oliviero and Romano (2015) on governance.
2Support for these starkly di↵erent views can be found, for example, in reports by the Economist Intelligence
Unit. In the depths of the Great Recession in June 2009 they wrote in favor of the Tsarist view: “Firms should
be centralizing their decision-making processes.....In a recession investments and other decisions are scrutinized more
carefully by senior management and a greater emphasis is placed on projects that provide benefits across the enterprise
rather than individual units.” Yet three months later in August they supported the localist approach “Companies
have to deal with dramatically more uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity in the current recession. Success does not
come from centralization. True flexibility arises when those who are closest to customers are empowered to respond
to constant shifts in demand, preferences and attitudes.”
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proach. The model generates the prediction that, to the extent they increase turbulence, recessions
make decentralization more attractive by enabling firms to better adapt to the turbulent business
environment. This result is akin to those emerging from a wide class of models where higher tur-
bulence and uncertainty increase the value of local knowledge and the benefits of decentralization.
Consistent with our model, we show that our empirical results are driven by the fact that
the industries which had the most severe downturns during the Great Recession also had the
largest increase in turbulence, as measured by product churn. This novel industry level measure
of turbulence is the rate of new product additions and subtractions built from the Census of
Manufactures ten digit product data. As shown in Bernard and Okubo (2015), product churn rises
sharply during recessions - in a crisis firms both destroy more existing products and also create more
new products.3 Using this measure on the US Census data, we find that decentralization did not
significantly protect firms from the downturn in industries which had a bad shock, but no increase
in product churn. We validate these results using an alternative measure of turbulence based on the
stock market volatility, which is available for the international WMS sample as well as US MOPS.
Alternative explanations of our results based on reduced agency problems, financial conditions,
lower coordination costs, omitted variables and other factors do not seem so consistent with the
data. Finally, although organizational change is slow (we show evidence of large adjustment costs),
firms subject to large negative shocks appear more likely to decentralize.
Overall, our paper suggests that the internal organization of firms may serve as an important
mediating factor through which macroeconomic shocks a↵ect firm performance and, ultimately,
growth.
Our paper builds on an extensive prior literature. The benefits of exploiting local knowledge
harks back to a classic economic debate over economic systems between Lange (1936) and Von
Hayek (1945). Lange argued that a centralized socialist economy would outperform a decentralized
market economy partly because the central planner could co-ordinate better, for example by setting
prices to internalize externalities. By contrast, Hayek argued that it was impossible to aggregate
all the local knowledge of agents, and it was both more e cient (and just) to allow individuals
to make their decentralized choices based on the their local information. Modern organizational
economics builds upon these trade-o↵s within a firm rather than across the economy as a whole. On
the theory side, our paper relates to the literature on decentralization within the firm (see Gibbons,
Matouschek and Roberts, 2013, or Garicano and Rayo, 2016 for recent surveys) and incomplete
contracts (see Gibbons and Roberts, 2013, and Aghion, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2014 for surveys).
In particular, Hart and Moore (2005) analyze the optimal allocation of authority in multi-layer
3Bloom (2014) shows a large variety of datasets that suggest that turbulence and uncertainty rise in downturns.
One exception is Broda and Weinstein (2010) who report a pro-cyclical product churn. However, they have a a very
di↵erent focus - looking at the net change in the product o↵ering in retail stores (the number of new products sold
less current products no-longer sold) - and a di↵erent time period (1994 and 1999-2003) spanning one mild recession.
In contrast, our measure is gross product churn (new products plus dropped products), it is built on manufacturing
establishment production data, and spans 15 years from 1997-2012, exploiting aggregate and industry variation.
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hierarchies. Dessein (2002) analyzes how the allocation of control can help incorporate the agent’s
information into decision-making in a situation where the agent has private information.4
Our paper also relates to the existing empirical literature on decentralization and its determi-
nants. For example, Rajan and Wulf (2006) and Blundell et al. (2016) document a movement
towards flatter organizations and decentralized firms in the US and UK respectively. Caroli and
Van Reenen (2001) and Bresnahan, Brynjolfsson and Hitt (2002) point at positive correlations be-
tween decentralization and both human capital and information technology. Guadalupe and Wulf
(2009) argue that the Canadian-US Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 1989 constitutes an exogenous
increase in competition for US firms in the industries where tari↵s were removed and this caused
greater delayering and decentralization. Closest to our analysis is Acemoglu et al. (2007), whose
model assumes firms can learn about the outcome of an investment decision from observing other
firms. Hence, in sectors with more heterogeneity/turbulence or where the firm is closer to the
performance frontier (so that learning is more limited) decision-making control should be more
decentralized. In the contract literature, Prendergast (1982) suggested that the “puzzle” of per-
formance pay in uncertain and turbulent environments (where higher risk should make the agent
less willing to accept a high-powered contract) could be because of the need to exploit local infor-
mation more e↵ectively. Similarly, in the firm boundaries literature, Lafontaine and Slade (2007)
also suggest that a similar puzzle over the lack of a negative impact of turbulence on franchising
(vs. direct control), could again be related to the need to exploit the franchiser’s superior local
knowledge, which is more important in such environments. None of these papers, however, look
at the interplay between firm decentralization, shocks and turbulence which is the center of our
analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and methodology. Section 3
establishes our main empirical finding that in times of crisis decentralized firms outperform their
centralized counterparts. Section 4 develops a theoretical model which is consistent with this finding
and Section 5 tests the additional predictions of the model. Section 6 explores the validity of the
main results to alternative explanations and Section 7 concludes.
2 Data Description and Measurement
We start by describing in some detail our decentralization data since this involved an extensive new
survey process. We then describe the accounting and administrative data matched with the survey-
based measures of decentralization, the proxies measuring the severity of the Great Recession and
the novel industry level measures of product churn. More details on the data are in Appendix A.
4In contrast to Aghion and Tirole (1997), there is no information acquisition e↵ort by the agent or the principal,
therefore in Dessein’s model the allocation of authority is not so much a tool to motivate the agent (as in Aghion and
Tirole) or give a supplier incentives to make relationship specific investments (as in Grossman and Hart, 1986). The
main insight in Dessein (2002) is that in a world with asymmetric information and contractual incompleteness, the
delegation of authority from a Principal to an Agent is often the best way to elicit the agent’s private information.
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2.1 Decentralization
2.1.1 Cross-country data - World Management Survey
Our international decentralization data was collected in the context of the World Management
Survey (WMS), a large scale project aimed at collecting high quality data on management and
organizational design across firms around the world. The survey is conducted through an interview
with a plant manager in medium sized manufacturing firms.
We asked four questions on decentralization from the central headquarters to the local plant
manager. First, we asked how much capital investment a plant manager could undertake without
prior authorization from the corporate headquarters. This is a continuous variable enumerated in
national currency that we convert into dollars using PPPs.5 We also inquired on where decisions
were e↵ectively made in three other dimensions: (a) the introduction of a new product, (b) sales
and marketing decisions and (c) hiring a new full-time permanent shop floor employee. These more
qualitative variables were scaled from a score of 1, defined as all decisions taken at the corporate
headquarters, to a score of 5 defined as complete power (“real authority”) of the plant manager.
In Appendix Table A1 we detail the individual questions in the same order as they appeared
in the survey. Since the scaling may vary across all these questions, we standardized the scores
from the four decentralization questions to z-scores by normalizing each question to mean zero
and standard deviation one. We then average across all four z-scores and then z-score the average
again to have our primary measure of overall decentralization. In the same survey we collected
a large amount of additional data to use as controls, including management practice information
following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007) and human resource information (e.g.
the proportion of the workforce with college degrees, average hours worked, the gender and age
breakdown within the firm).
We attempt to achieve unbiased survey responses to our questions by taking a range of steps.
First, the survey was conducted by telephone without telling the managers they were being scored
on organizational or management practices. This enabled scoring to be based on the interviewer’s
evaluation of the firm’s actual practices, rather than their aspirations, the manager’s perceptions
or the interviewer’s impressions. To run this “blind scoring” we used open questions (i.e. “To
introduce a new product, what agreement would your plant need from corporate headquarters?”),
rather than closed questions (e.g. “Can you introduce new products without authority from corpo-
rate headquarters?” [yes/no]) (see question in Table A1). Second, the interviewers did not know
anything about the firm’s financial information or performance in advance of the interview.6 Con-
sequently, the survey tool is “double blind” - managers do not know they are being scored and
5One reason that the main regressions control for size is that the value of this question might be mechanically
greater for larger firms and plants.
6This was achieved by selecting medium sized manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact
details to the interviewers (but no financial details).
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interviewers do not know the performance of the firm. These manufacturing firms (the median size
was 250 employees) are too small to attract much coverage from the business media. Third, each
interviewer ran 85 interviews on average, allowing us to remove interviewer fixed e↵ects from all em-
pirical specifications. This helps to address concerns over inconsistent interpretation of responses.
Fourth, we collected information on the interview process itself (duration, day-of-the-week), on the
manager (seniority, job tenure and location), and on the interviewer (for removing analyst fixed
e↵ects and subjective reliability score). These survey metrics are used as “noise controls” to help
reduce residual variation.
We decided to focus on the manufacturing sector where productivity is easier to measure than in
the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on medium sized firms, selecting a sampling frame
of firms with between 50 and 5,000 workers. Very small firms have little publicly available data.
Very large firms are likely to be more heterogeneous across plants. We drew a sampling frame from
each country to be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms and then randomly chose
the order of which firms to contact.
Each interview took on average of 48 minutes and the main wave was run in the summer of 2006.
We achieved a 45% response rate, which is very high for company surveys, because (i) the interview
did not discuss firm’s finances (we obtained these externally); (ii) we had the written endorsement
of many o cial institutions like the Bundesbank, Treasury and World Bank, and (iii) we hired high
quality MBA-type students. We also ran some follow up surveys in 2009 and 2010 following the
same firms sampled in 2006 to form a panel which we use to look at changes in decentralization.
2.1.2 U.S. Census data - MOPS
The 2010 Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS) was jointly funded by the
Census Bureau and the National Science Foundation as a supplement to the Annual Survey of
Manufactures (ASM). The design was based on the World Management Survey and was mailed to
the establishment plant manager (see Bloom et al. 2016 and Brynjolfsson and McElheran 2016).
The survey contained six questions on decentralization with four of these covering the same domain
as WMS - plant manager autonomy over (a) capital investments, (b) hiring of full time employees,
(c) product introduction and (d) sales and marketing - with two additional question on e) pay
increases of at least 10%, and (f) product pricing decisions. For each question, respondents were
asked to choose among three options capturing where the specific decisions were made: “only at this
establishment” (coded as 3), “only at headquarters” (coded as 1), or “both at this establishment
and at headquarters” (coded as 2). There were five choices for the question on autonomy in capital
investments, starting with “Under $1,000” (coded as 1) up until “$1 million or more” (coded as
5). Each of these six questions was then z-scored, and then averaged, and then z-scored again.
The survey also included management practice questions and some background questions on the
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establishment and respondent.7 The respondent was asked about conditions in 2010 and 2005.
The MOPS survey was sent to all ASM establishments in the ASM mail-out sample. Overall,
49,782 MOPS surveys were successfully delivered, and 37,177 responses were received, yielding a
response rate of 78%. The Organization Module of MOPS is only for plants where headquarters
is o↵ site - plants with headquarters on site are told to skip this section - which takes the sample
to about 20,000 plants. We further require the sample to match to the 2006 ASM and 2009 ASM
to calculate the main dependent variable (growth in sales) which brings the sample down to 8,774
plants.8 Table A2 shows how our various samples are derived from the universe of establishments.
2.2 Accounting data
2.2.1 Cross-country WMS data
We build firm level measures of sales, employment, capital, profits and materials using accounting
data extracted from Bureau Van Dijk’s ORBIS. These are digitized versions of company accounts
covering very large samples (close to the population in most of our countries) of private and publicly
listed firms. In our baseline specifications we estimate in three-year (annualized) growth rates. We
are able to build firm level measure of sales growth for at least one year for 1,330 out of the 2,351
firms with decentralization data in 2006.
2.2.2 U.S. MOPS data
In addition to our decentralization data, we also use data from other Census and non-Census data
sets to create our measures of performance (growth in sales, productivity, and profitability). We use
establishment level data on sales, value-added and labor inputs from the ASM to create measures
of growth and labor productivity. As described in more detail in Appendix A, we also combined
the plant-level capital stock data from the Census of Manufactures with investment data from the
ASM and applied the perpetual inventory method to construct annual capital stocks. Finally, for
profitability we use profits as a percent of capital stock, with profits defined as sales less total
salaries and wages, material costs, and rental expenses.
2.3 Measuring the Great Recession
Our baseline measure of the intensity of impact of the Great Recession (“SHOCK”) at an industry
by country cell level comes from the UN COMTRADE database of world trade. This is an interna-
tional database of six-digit product level information on all bilateral imports and exports between
any given pairs of countries. We aggregate COMTRADE data from its original six-digit product
7The full questionnaire is available on http://www.census.gov/mcd/mops/how the data are collected/MP-
10002 16NOV10.pdf.
8The ASM is a stratified randomly sampled rotating 4 year panel, so many plants are not included across panels,
which accounts for over 90% of this drop in sample size
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level to three-digit US SIC-1987 level using the Pierce and Schott (2010) concordance. We deflate
the industry and country specific export value series by a country and year specific CPI from the
OECD to measure “real exports.”9
Figure A1 shows the evolution of annualized export growth in the years preceding and during
Great Recession using industry level data for all countries (for a total of 5,641 manufacturing sector
by country cells). Exports were growing by about 13% in 2007 and 9% in 2008, and experienced
a dramatic fall (-20%) in 2009 compared to 2008. Industry sales fell even faster than exports in
2008 and 2009. In the empirical analysis, we build empirical proxies for the Great Recession by
averaging 2007 and 2006 (pre-recession) and 2009 and 2008 (in-recession) levels and calculate log
di↵erences between the two sub-periods for each three-digit industry by country cell.10
Since recessions typically have a greater impact on reducing the expenditure on durable versus
non-durable goods (e.g. King and Rebelo, 1999), we use as an alternative variable to capture the
intensity of the Great Recession shock the average durability of the goods produced in the industry,
drawn from Ramey and Nekarda (2013). As a cross-sectional measure this is simply used at the
4-digit industry level, and is a continuous measure.11
2.4 Descriptive Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 contains some descriptive statistics from the WMS. The median (average) firm
has 250 (574) employees and $67m ($184m) in sales. Firm sales declined by about 6% per year
over this time period (2011-2006). Panel B has the equivalent information from MOPS. Despite
being a quite di↵erent sample, the values look broadly comparable with a median plant size of 135
compared to 150 in the WMS. MOPS firms are a little smaller in terms of sales than WMS: $50.5m
($137m) at the median (mean) compared to $67m ($184m), but they are a bit larger in terms of
jobs (423 at the median and 1,354 at the mean). MOPS firms shrank by 7% a year, similar to the
WMS average. Exports fell in 51% of the industries in the sample. While the median growth rate
of real exports across the whole sample is about -0.4% and -0.8% in the WMS and MOPS samples,
respectively, the data shows considerable variation both within and across countries.
2.5 Measuring Turbulence: Product Churn
In the latter part of our empirical analysis, we also include changes in product churn in recession
versus non recession years as a proxy for increases in market turbulence. Product churn is measured
using data from the US Census of Manufactures (CM). The CM, which is conducted in years ending
9We find similar results using other measures of the shock (such as industry sales derived from aggregating firm
level data in ORBIS), but trade data is attractive as it has a large external component driven by demand in world
markets and is available at a detailed level for every country and industry in our sample.
10We also show robustness checks using discrete measure of SHOCK, in which we code an industry-country cell
to be unity if exports fell over this period and zero otherwise.
11We also consider a discrete version using a dummy equal to 1 if the durability in the industry is greater than the
median (and zero otherwise).
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in 2 and 7, asks manufacturing plants to list the value of annual shipments by 10-digit product
code. Plants receive a list of all the product codes typically produced in their industry, along with
corresponding descriptions of each code. Plants which produce products not listed on the form are
instructed to write in the appropriate product code.
We then measure the amount of product churn at the plant level as the number of products
added or dropped between the previous Census and the current Census, divided by the average
number of products produced in both Censuses. That is, product churn for establishment i in year
t is defined as:
Product Churn i,t =
#Products Added i,t +#Products Dropped i,t
0.5 (# Products i,t +#Products i,t 5)
2 [0, 2] (1)
Our measure of industry product churn is the average plant level product churn amongst all plants
within an industry (three digit US SIC-1987) which produce at least 3 products. We restrict
attention to plants with at least 3 products in order to reduce measurement error from product
code misreporting.12 Finally, in order to measure the change in product churn by industry during
the Great Recession, we calculate the change in product churn from 2007 to 2012 as industry-level
product churn in 2012 minus industry-level product churn in 2007 (constructed from the 2007 and
2002 Censuses).
Note that the measure is based on plants who survived between Census years. We also con-
structed an alternative measure that included plants which died and entered between Census years
in the construction of equation (1). This broader measure led to similar results.
2.6 Measuring Turbulence: Stock Market volatility
Since the product churn measure is available only for the MOPS sample, we also use as an alternative
proxy for the increase in market turbulence a measure derived from the uncertainty literature.
We measure the standard deviation in monthly firm-level stock market returns in an industry
by year cell over population of publicly listed firms in each country. The stock returns measure
of uncertainty is the most standard firm-level measure and similar to those used by Leahy and
Whited (1996) for example. In a stochastic volatility model based on Dixit and Pindyck (1994)
the variance of stock returns will be a good predictor of the underlying level of uncertainty. These
measures are then used in changes as an alternative proxy for the increase in turbulence. In the
US we pool at the three digit SIC level as there are about 2,000 publicly listed firms. In the other
OECD countries there are fewer publicly listed firms so we construct the measure at the SIC 2 digit
level.
12Establishments which produce the same portfolio of products in consecutive Censuses but misreport a product
code in one year will be incorrectly measured as having switched products. Product code misreporting is particularly
problematic for establishments with 1 or 2 products, for whom a single reporting mistake would result in very high
measured product churn. Our results are robust to using industries with plants with a lower cut-o↵ of 2 or more
products or a higher cut-o↵ of 5 or more products.
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3 Main results
3.1 Descriptive analysis of the main result
Our main empirical finding is illustrated in Figure 1, in which Panel A refers to the results using
the cross country WMS data, and Panel B uses the US MOPS data. Panel A shows the annualized
average three-year growth rate in sales for all firms included in the WMS decentralization sample
computed using data ending in the years 2011, 2010 and 2009 (hence, averaging across three
di↵erent growth periods: 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06).13 These are all years covering the Great
Recession.14 Panel B shows sales growth for all plants in the MOPS decentralization sample (2009-
06 growth rate). We exclude the 2011-08 and 2010-07 periods from the MOPS sample because the
recession was over in the US in 2010.15
The sample in Figure 1 is subdivided in four categories of firms. First, we split firms according
to whether they experienced a drop in exports in an industry by country cell in the main Great
Recession years (the 2008 and 2009 average) compared to the latest pre-recession years (2006 and
2007 average).16 Second, we split firms by above/below the mean level of decentralization measured
before the advent of the Great Recession. Not surprisingly, all our groupings of firms experienced
a drop in average sales and furthermore, the drop in sales is clearly (and significantly) larger for
firms classified in industries experiencing a negative export shock (compare the two bars on the
right with the two on the left). However, within the group of firms experiencing a negative shock
(those on the right of the figure), the decline in sales was significantly larger for firms that were
more centralized prior to the recession. In the WMS sample, for firms in an industry-country pair
hit by a greater negative shock, decentralized firms had a 8.2% fall in sales compared to about
11.8% in the centralized firms, for a di↵erence of 3.6 percentage points which is significant at the
5% level (compared to an insignificant di↵erence of -0.1% in industries that did not experienced a
shock). In the MOPS sample, the di↵erence in di↵erences is very similar at 3.5 percentage points,
also significant at the 5% level.
The basic finding emerging from the raw data is that decentralization was associated with
relatively better performance for firms facing the toughest environment during the crisis. We now
turn to more formal tests of this basic result using alternative measurement strategies and controls
for many other possible confounders.
13We use long di↵erences to smooth over some of the transitory measurement error. The results are robust to
choosing alternative methods of long di↵erencing.
14We also test the robustness of the results to dropping the 2008-2011 period, in which the Recession was starting
to taper o↵ in Europe.
15In Europe (where most of our WMS data is from) the crisis remained severe due to the Eurozone currency crisis
and tough fiscal austerity policies.
16To be precise we first divide the value of nominal exports by a country and time specific CPI. We then construct
average real exports in (i) 2009 and 2008 and (ii) 2007 and 2007. We then take the log di↵erence between these two
periods.
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3.2 Baseline regression equation
Our baseline specification is:
  lnYijct = ↵DECi0 +  (DECi0 ⇤ SHOCKjc) +  SHOCKjc +  xi0 + ✓c +  j + ⌧t + "ijct (2)
where   lnYijct is the sales growth rate: the three year annualized change in ln(real sales) for firm
(or plant) i in industry j in country c in end-year t.17 DECi0 is firm i ’s level of decentralization
(measured in the initial year of 2006 for WMS and 2005 for MOPS); SHOCKjk is our measure of
the severity of the shock of recession in the industry-country cell; xi0 is a set of firm level controls
also measured pre-recession (firm and plant size, survey noise and the proportion of college-educated
employees); ✓c are country dummies,  j are industry dummies, ⌧t are year dummies and "icjt and is
an error term. Standard errors are clustered at the industry by country level, or just industry level
depending on the variables used to proxy for the Great Recession and the specific sample used.
When we use export growth as a measure of the shock the key hypothesis we examine is whether
  < 0 , i.e. whether decentralized firms do relatively better in bad times. When we use product
durability as a measure of the magnitude of the shock the equivalent hypothesis is that   > 0 , as
the more durable goods industries are expected to have (and do have) the largest fall in demand.
Our underlying identification assumption in equation (2) is that in the pre-Great Recession
period firms were in an initial equilibrium where they had adopted their optimal degree of de-
centralization ( DECi0 ) based on their current and expected environment.18 The SHOCKjk
associated with the Great Recession was largely unexpected and, since organizational form is likely
subject to large adjustment costs, firms could not immediately respond by changing to the optimal
form of organization (i.e. becoming more decentralized) in the new environment. Thus, DECi0 can
be considered weakly exogenous in equation (2). We investigate the adjustment costs assumption
by using repeat observations on decentralization for the same plants over time. We find decen-
tralization to be highly persistent over the time in both the WMS and MOPS samples.19 We
also consider potential violations of these assumptions below (e.g. in sub-section 3.4), such as the
presence of other unobservables correlated with DECi0 that could cause firms to outperform in
bad times.
17As discussed above, for the long di↵erences we are using the three overlapping time periods for WMS, but for
MOPS we can only use one of these long di↵erences, 2009-2006.
18Formally, we do not need to assume fully optimizing behavior in the pre-period, only that DECi0 is weakly
exogenous.
19We estimate that the annual AR(1) coe cient on decentralization as 0.965 in MOPS and 0.707 in WMS. The
true persistence parameter is likely to lie between these as MOPS estimate is likely to be an over-estimate because of
recall bias and the WMS is likely to be an underestimate because of classical measurement error. See Bloom, Sadun
and Van Reenen (2016) for more structural estimation of adjustment costs in WMS also showing high degrees of
persistence of organizational form.
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3.3 Baseline results
Column (1) of Table 2 shows the results from estimating a simple specification including export
growth as our recession shock indicator and a full set of country, year and three-digit industry
dummies. A one percent increase in industry exports is associated with a significant 0.07 percentage
point increase in sales growth. We also find a positive and weakly significant association between
sales growth and lagged initial decentralization (in 2006). A one standard deviation increase in
our decentralization index is associated with a 0.58 percentage point increase in sales growth (e.g.
growth increases from say 2.0% a year to 2.6% a year). In column (2) we introduce an interaction
term between decentralization and the export shock variable. The interaction term is negative and
significant (0.042 with a standard error of 0.013), which indicates that decentralized firms shrank
much less than their centralized counterparts when they were hit by a negative export shock. Note
that the coe cient on the linear decentralization term is insignificant when the interaction term is
added to the specification, which indicates that decentralized firms did not grow significantly faster
or slower in those sectors that had zero export growth.
The magnitudes of the coe cients are non-trivial. Consider a macro shock causing a 1% fall in
exports. The coe cients in column (2) of Table 2 suggests that the sales of an average firm (with
mean decentralization score of zero) will shrink three times as much as those of a decentralized firm
(with a score one standard deviation above the mean).20 Panel A of Figure 2 shows the implied
marginal e↵ect of decentralization on sales growth as a function of export growth. These plots are
obtained using the coe cients reported in column (2) of Table 2. According to these estimates,
decentralization has a positive association with sales growth in all industries experiencing country-
industry export growth below 8%. This corresponds to two-thirds of the WMS sample in the
post recession period, but only 12% of firms in the pre-recession periods (this is shown in Panel
B of Figure 2). In other words, the positive association between decentralization and firm growth
appear to be contingent on the wider demand conditions in the aggregate environment facing the
firm, which in turn may be one of the possible reasons for the heterogeneous levels of decentralization
observed in 2006. It is important to emphasize that we are not claiming that decentralization is
always the optimal form of firm organization - it is very much contingent on the di↵erent conditions
that firms face.21
The recession shock measure is industry and country specific. Therefore, in column (3) of
Table 2 we include a full set of industry dummies interacted with country dummies, as well as
a set of other firm controls (measured in 2006). The linear export shock is absorbed by the
industry by country dummies, but we can still identify the interaction of the shock with initial firm
20Assuming the e↵ects were causal for illustrative purposes, the average firm will see a drop in sales of 0.062% (the
coe cient on export growth) whereas the decentralized firm will see a fall in sales of just 0.020% (0.062 minus 0.042,
the coe cient on the interaction).
21In other work done using the WMS decentralization data (Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen, 2012) we discuss
other influences on firm decentralization such as scale, human capital, complexity and culture. We exploit one source
of this variation (trust) in an instrumental variable approach discussed below.
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decentralization. Even in this demanding specification, the interaction between decentralization
and the shock remains negative and significant.22
A possible concern with the estimates is that the SHOCK variable uses information dated
over the same period as the dependent variable, which may give raise to an endogeneity bias.
Consequently, we test for the robustness of the main results using as a proxy for the intensity of the
Great Recession a measure of the durability of the products in the four-digit industry calculated
prior to the recession. We include a full set of four-digit industry dummies to absorb the linear
e↵ects in column (4). Consistent with the earlier results, the interaction between decentralization
and the SHOCK is positive (since more durable industries experienced greater drops in demand
during the recession) and significant.23
An alternative exogenous shifter of the shock measure to durability is to construct a Bartik
style IV where we predict the change in exports from an industry-country pair. We constructed
this for every HS six digit commodity in a country by interacting the lagged (i.e., built using
2006/2007 data) export share of the commodity from country r to a partner country p with the
partner country’s growth in imports (of that commodity) between 2006/07 and 2008/09 from all
countries except country r. Summing this across all partner countries and then aggregating to the
three digit industry level gives an IV for the export shock. The results from using this Bartik IV
are very similar to those shown in Table 2.24
Columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 repeat the specifications of columns (3) and (4) using the MOPS
sample. Remarkably, although drawn from a distinct dataset, a single country (US) and di↵erent
survey methodology, the results in this larger sample of plants are extremely similar to the ones
reported using the cross country WMS data. The coe cients on the interaction terms are of the
same sign, statistically significant and of a broadly comparable magnitude.
The results discussed so far suggest the presence of a positive relationship between firm sales
growth and decentralization in the industries most a↵ected by the Great Recession. In Table 3 we
explore whether this relationship persists even when we examine Total Factor Productivity (TFP),
i.e. we estimate the most general econometric model of Table 2, column (3) but also control for
increases in other inputs such as employment, capital and materials on the right hand side of the
equation. As discussed in the introduction, some have argued that firms need to centralize during
crises, so tough cost controls and e ciency-enhancing measures can be driven down throughout the
22Other measures of the demand shock give similar qualitative results to using exports. For example, using industry
output built from aggregating the ORBIS population data in the same way as exports (across the three digit industry
by country cell between the 2009-08 and 2007-06 periods) generates a coe cient (standard error) on the interaction
term of 0.060 (0.015).
23The specification in column (4) can be regarded as the reduced form of an IV regression where we use durability as
an instrumental variable for the shock. When we use decentralization*durability to instrument for SHOCK*durability
in an IV specification on the sample in column (3), we obtain a coe cient (standard error)of -0.165 (0.052) on the
decentralization*SHOCKinteraction.
24For example, the IV coe cient(standard error) on the interaction of export growth and decentralization is -
0.065(0.029) using the Bartik IV. This is similar with the OLS estimate of -0.047(0.018) in column (3) of Table 2.
The first stage is strong with an F-statistic of 29.5.
13
company. This would imply that although decentralized firms may fare better on protecting sales
revenue during downturns, they will do worse in terms of productivity.
Column (1) of Table 3 reports the baseline results for sales growth on the subsample of firms
with data on factor inputs, while column (2) reports the productivity results.25 Decentralization
is also significantly and positively associated with an increase in TFP during a crisis.26 Column
(3) uses the growth of profitability (Earnings Before Interest and Tax divided by the capital stock)
as the dependent variable and also finds a negative coe cient on the interaction although it is not
significant at conventional levels. Column (4) investigates whether the positive association also
extends to the extensive margin of adjustment, using an exit regression. The dependent variable
is a dummy taking the value of one if the firm exited to bankruptcy between 2007 and 2011 and
zero otherwise (the regression is a Linear Probability Model). This shows that more decentralized
firms also had a significantly lower probability of exit in industries that were worse hit by the crisis.
Columns (5) though (7) repeat the analysis using the MOPS data, and again finds a negative
and significant coe cient on the interaction term between decentralization and the shock for sales,
productivity and profits growth.27
3.4 Identification and robustness
A concern with the results is that our decentralization interaction is simply picking up long-run
trends or proxying for some unobserved variable. To address these issues we took several steps.
Placebo test in a pre-crisis period First, we address the concern that the Decentralization⇤
SHOCK interaction may simply be picking up some other time-invariant industry characteristic
associated with the magnitude of the recession and firm organization. To allay this concern, we
examine the relationship between sales growth and the Decentralization ⇤ SHOCK interaction
in a sample including years preceding the Great Recession in Table 4. Finding the same results
in this period would raise the concern that the SHOCK dummy captures unobserved industry
heterogeneity unrelated to the Great Recession such that decentralized firms always did better in
certain sectors. Thus, we regard this as a placebo test. We look again at three year di↵erences
in growth but instead pool across the 3-year di↵erences 2008-05, 2007-04, 2006-03 and 2005-02 to
define the pre-recession growth rates (in column (1) labeled (“year<=2005”), and 2011-08, 2010-07
25The sample for the TFP regression is smaller due to missing data on some of the additional inputs needed for
the production functions specification (in many countries revenues are a mandatory item on company accounts, but
other inputs such as capital are not).
26The sum of the unreported coe cients on employment, capital and materials growth is about 0.9 suggesting
decreasing returns to scale (and/or market power). Measurement error may also be responsible for attenuating the
coe cients on factor inputs towards zero. Note that if we calculate TFP as a residual using cost shares as weights
on the factor inputs and use this as the dependent variable (dropping the factor shares from the right hand side) are
results are similar to those from the estimated production function.
27We have no exit data for MOPS as the survey was run in 2011 after the Great Recession, with our main results
using the recall question on decentralization in 2005.
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and 2009-06 (as in the earlier tables) to define the post-recession years (column (2)). Column (1)
shows that the coe cient onDecentralization⇤SHOCK is actually positive, although insignificant,
in the years preceding the Great Recession. Column (2) repeats the results of the specification of
Table 2, column (3). Column (3) repeats the regression on the pooled pre-crisis and post-crisis
samples of the first two columns, and includes a full set of interactions with a dummy indicator
taking a value of one for all crisis years (the three year di↵erences from 2009-06 and later) to
estimate a “di↵erences in di↵erences in di↵erences” specification. The coe cient on the triple
interaction POST2006⇤Decentralization⇤SHOCK interaction is negative and significant, which
implies that the e↵ect of decentralization in industries hit by the Great Recession is arising entirely
from the Great Recession years. We repeated the same analysis on productivity with very similar
results in the last three columns.
Instrumental variables As a second approach to investigating whether it is really decentral-
ization (or a correlated unobservable) responsible for superior firm performance in bad times we
considered an instrumental variable (IV) strategy. A potential IV is the regional variation in gen-
eralized trust in the population around the firm’s headquarters. Bloom, Sadun and Van Reenen
(2012) show that variations in trust is strongly predictive for decentralization and this relationship
is likely to be causal. Trust is measured from the World Values Survey and is calculated as the
share of individuals agreeing with the statement that “Generally speaking, people can be trusted”.
Trust can have a direct e↵ect on performance in our context, but we require a stronger assumption
than in Bloom et al. (2012) that trust only influences a firm’s performance di↵erentially in bad
times through a firm’s organizational structure.
In column (1) of Table 5 we report the OLS results in the sub-sample for which we have data
to construct the trust IV, showing the standard negative interaction between decentralization and
the shock. In column (2) we report the reduced form showing a strong negative interaction - high
trust (and hence highly decentralized) regions have firms that are less damaged by negative shocks.
Finally, in columns (3) to (5) we report the two first-stages and the second stage, finding our
familiar result that decentralization reduces the impact of export shocks on firms, protecting them
from negative export shocks.
Other factors correlated with decentralization We also explored the robustness of our
results to a series of tests related to unobserved firm and industry level heterogeneity. First, in
Appendix Tables A3 and A4 we investigated whether the Decentralization ⇤ SHOCK interaction
captures the relevance of other firm level characteristics correlated with decentralization. Specifi-
cally we augment the baseline specification of column (3) in Table 2 with interactions terms between
the Great Recession indicator and a series of additional firm level controls. These included the
overall management quality of the firm, the pre-recession size of the plant and firm, skills, decen-
tralization from the plant manager to production workers and plant manager characteristics (age,
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immigrant status and gender). In all instances, the coe cient on the Decentralization ⇤SHOCK
interaction remained significant in both the WMS and the MOPS data even in the presence of
the extra interactions.28 We also tested whether the SHOCK measure could be reflecting other
industry characteristics rather than the demand fall. In Appendix Table A5 we show that our key
interaction is robust to including interactions of decentralization with a number of other industry
characteristics such as asset tangibility, inventories, dependency on external finance and labor costs.
Validity of Exports as a shock measure We have argued that trade changes are an attractive
indicator of the Great Recession shock as they are more likely to reflect what is happening to
demand in world markets than being a reflection of country and industry specific supply factors.
Furthermore, we have also shown above that our results are robust to alternative indicators of the
shock such as the industry-specific durability measure and a Bartik style IV. As a further check
we estimated our models separately for exporting establishments vs. non-exporting establishments
using the MOPS data (export data is not an item required in the company accounts data). As
expected, the results are driven by the exporting plants who are most directly exposed to trade
shocks.29
4 A simple model
To understand what might underlie the stylized empirical finding that decentralized firms do better
in bad times, we develop a simple model based upon Aghion and Tirole (1997). The key idea is
that there is a trade o↵ between incentives and local information. Since there are agency problems
between the CEO and plant manager, centralization may seem natural. But the plant manager is
likely to have better local information than the CEO which is a force for decentralization. When
the environment becomes more turbulent, the CEO is even less well informed than in normal times.
Therefore, in our model local information becomes more important and decentralization becomes
more valuable.
4.1 Basic set up
We consider a one-period model of a firm with one principal (the CEO/ central headquarters) and
one agent (the plant manager).The CEO cares about the profitability of the business whereas the
28Although the additional variables were usually insignificant, there are exceptions. In Appendix Table A3, Decen-
tralization from plant manager to workers exhibits a similar pattern to our main decentralization measure of power
between the central headquarters and plant manager. This suggests that decentralizing decision-making throughout
the hierarchy is beneficial during times of crisis. The management interaction is also weakly significant, although in
this case the coe cient is positive. In other words, well managed firms perform relatively better in good times than
in bad.
29For example, using the baseline MOPS specification in Table 2 column (5) we estimate a coe cient(standard error)
of -0.044(0.023) on the Decentralization*SHOCK variable for the exporters (4,200 observations) and -0.024(0.020) for
the non-exporters.
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plant manager wants to maximize private benefits and is not responsive to monetary incentives.30
Taking an uninformed action involves potentially disastrous outcomes, thus an action will be taken
only if at least one of the two parties is informed. Also, the agent obtains private benefits only if
the firm remains in business.
There are n   3 possible actions (or projects) and at any point in time only two of them
are ”relevant”, i.e. avoid negative payo↵s to the parties. Among these two actions, one maximizes
monetary profitability, one maximizes the agent’s private utility. Other actions lead to very negative
payo↵s to both parties.
With ex ante probability ↵ the agent’s preferred action (conditional upon the firm remaining
in business) will also be the action that maximizes profits (or monetary e ciency); this variable ↵
captures the degree of congruence between the principal’s preferences and the agent’s preferences.
If preferences coincide then the action that maximizes the private utility of the agent also yields
monetary utility B to the principal; if preferences do not coincide, the action that maximizes the
agent’s private utility yields monetary payo↵ B   k to the principal.
Informational assumptions: We assume that the principal knows about project payo↵s with
probability p , but does not know directly which action the agent actually performed. On the other
hand, the agent is assumed to be perfectly informed about the project payo↵s.
Turbulence: Suppose that the principal can obtain an early signal of forthcoming performance,
e.g. a current realization of income, at some cost C, and can then possibly decide to fire the agent
if she believes that the signal is due to the agent’s choosing a non-profit maximizing action. In the
absence of turbulence, the signal reveals the bad action choice perfectly. But the higher the degree
of turbulence, the more di cult it is for the principal to infer action choice from performance.
Thus, suppose that current performance is given by
y = a+ "
where a 2 {a1, a2} denotes the agent’s action choice (e.g. a decision whether or not to introduce a
new product31), with a1 < a2 and " is a noise term uniformly distributed on the interval [ u, u].
4.2 Solving the model
Suppose that the plant manager takes the non-profit maximizing action a1 (e.g. a decision which
delays the introduction of a new product). The CEO will infer the action choice from observing
30This is to rule out implementation of a performance pay contract to overcome the principal-agent problem.
Obviously, we could allow some incentive contracts and so long as these only partially deal with the agency problem,
the mechanisms we describe here would still be at play.
31Equivalently, this could be whether to drop an existing product from the portfolio or to make an investment in
marketing or sales that enhances the product’s value to the consumer. The key thing is that the decision has to have
some irreversibility.
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the signal realization:
y = a+ " ,
if and only if y 2 [a1   u, a2   u)[ (a1 + u, a2 + u] and then can correct it if she has control rights,
i.e. under centralization
By Bayes’ rule the probability of the CEO guessing the action choice is:
P (u) = Pr(y 2 [a1   u, a2   u) [ (a1 + u, a2 + u]) , (3)
that is:
P (u) = min{ 2(a2   a1)
a2   a1 + 2u, 1}. (4)
The probability of guessing the correct action is clearly declining in the amount of noise pa-
rameterized by u. Hence the probability that the profit-maximizing action will be taken eventually
under centralization ( ⌦ ), is equal to:
⌦(u) = P (u) + (1  P (u))↵, (5)
where p is the probability that the principal acquires the information about projects payo↵s.
4.3 Centralization versus decentralization
The ex ante CEO’s payo↵ under decentralization, is equal to:
⇧d = ↵B + (1  ↵)(B   k)
The ex ante CEO’s payo↵ under centralization (i.e. if the CEO delegates no authority to the
plant manager), is equal to:
⇧c = ⌦(u)B + [1  ⌦(u)](B   k)  C (6)
Letting the relative value of decentralization be defined as:
 ⇧ = ⇧d  ⇧c, (7)
our key result is that:
Proposition 1: @ ⇧@u   0. An increase in turbulence u will make decentralization more
profitable,
Proof.
@ ⇧
@u
=  ⌦0(u)k
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From equation (5) ⌦0(u)k = (1  ↵)kP 0(u) . So:
@ ⇧
@u
=  (1  ↵)kP 0(u)   0
Since from equation (4) shows that P 0(u)  0.
5 Testing the main prediction of the model
5.1 Turbulence: Product churn and stock market volatility
We now examine the empirical validity of the prediction in proposition 1 by using cross-industry
variations in the change in product churn after the Great Recession as a proxy for the increase
in turbulence. Before examining the relationship between sales growth, decentralization and tur-
bulence (as measured by product churn), we first examined whether decentralization really was
greater in industries where turbulence was higher. Figure A2 shows that this is indeed the case:
plants in the top quintile of product churn industries had a decentralization index about 0.2 of
a standard deviation higher than those in the bottom quintile. More formally, Table A6 finds a
positive and significant relationship between decentralization (the dependent variable) and product
churn, particularly for decentralization of decisions regarding product introduction and sales and
marketing, as the theory would suggest (see next subsection). Furthermore, we checked whether
product churn had indeed increased more in industries that experienced a larger drop in exports
during the Great Recession. This is also the case in the data, as shown in Figure A3 (the slope is
-0.188 and highly significant).
To investigate the empirical validity of Proposition 1, we extend our basic equation (2) to
include both the change in CHURN and also its interaction with decentralization
  lnYij = ↵DECi0 +  (DECi0 ⇤ SHOCKj) +  SHOCKj (8)
+⌘ CHURNj + µ (DECi0 ⇤ CHURNj) +  xi0 +  j + ⌧t + "ij
where  CHURNj is the change in churn in industry j (since we estimate this regression model
only in the US MOPS sample we omit the country sub-script). According to the model µ > 0 ,
since churn increases the value of decentralization. Moreover, to the extent that our export shock
variable is proxying for rising turbulence during recessions, we would also expect   to drop in
magnitude in equation (8) compared to equation (2).
Table 6 shows the results.32 In column (1) we estimate the specification in column (4) of Table
2 for the subset of firms for which an industry level measure of product churn could be built. This
32Since we are measuring churn 2012-2007 (our Census of Manufactures years) we use as our dependent variable
the change in ln(sales) between 2007 and 2012 which is why the sample is slightly smaller.
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has similar results to the overall sample, i.e. the coe cient on the interaction DECi0 ⇤ SHOCKj
is negative and statistically significant. Column (2) includes the DECio ⇤ CHURNj interaction
instead of the DECi0 ⇤SHOCKj interaction. In line with the model’s prediction, the coe cient on
the interaction with changes in product churn is positive and significant, i.e. sales growth appears
to have a positive association with decentralization in industries that experienced a greater increase
in turbulence, as proxied by product churn. Column (3) includes both interactions. The coe cient
on the interaction between decentralization and product churn remains positive and significant,
while the coe cient on the interaction between decentralization and growth in industry exports
drops by half in magnitude compared to column (1) and is insignificant. Columns (4) to (6) repeat
the same specifications, this time using durability as an alternative industry level proxy for the
Great Recession. The coe cient on the interaction between decentralization and product churn is
positive and significant, and its inclusion reduces the magnitude of the coe cient on the interaction
between decentralization and durability, driving it to insignificance.
As discussed in the data section, we also used the change in stock market volatility in an
industry by country cell as an alternative measure of turbulence. An advantage of this measure is
that it is available for the WMS as well as MOPS, but a disadvantage is that it is constructed from
firms listed on the stock market (in the same industry). Table 7 shows the results. In column (1)
we reproduce the specification in column (2) of Table 2.33 In column (2) we use the interaction
between decentralization and the change in the standard deviation of stock market returns instead
of our usual interaction. As expected from the theory, the coe cient is positive and significant
suggesting that decentralized firms outperform their centralized counterparts in industries where
stock market volatility has increased by more. In column (3) we include both interactions. The
stock market volatility interaction remains positive and significant whereas the coe cient on the
export growth interaction falls by a third in magnitude and is now only significant at the 10%
level. The next three columns reproduce the same specifications using the MOPS data showing a
qualitatively similar pattern.
Taking Tables 6 and 7 together, it appears that decentralized firms did relatively better in
industries where turbulence increased. At least part of the reason why decentralized firms do
better in bad times appears to be because the industries worse hit by the Great Recession were
also those where turbulence also increased, consistent with our simple model.
5.2 Types of decentralization
As a related experiment to shed light on the model we looked at the di↵erent sub-questions which
form the overall decentralization index, as shown in Table 8. Since the Great Recession was
associated with a decrease in output demand, we would expect that decentralization over managerial
33The only di↵erence is that we are using two-digit dummies instead of three-digit dummies to match the level of
aggregation for the stock market volatility measures.
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discretion over outputs (sales and new products) would be more important than delegation over
inputs (like labor and capital). We start in column (1) by showing the baseline result of Table 2,
column (3). In columns (2) and (3) we repeat the estimation using as the decentralization index
a z-scored average of the two questions capturing plant manager decentralization for hiring and
investment decisions in column (2), and for sales and marketing and product introduction in column
(3). In columns (4) to (6) we repeat the same exercise for the U.S. MOPS sample.34 In both cases,
the positive e↵ect of decentralization in a crisis is primarily driven by the output related questions.
This finding provides additional insight on the possible mechanism through which decentralization
may positively a↵ect firm performance during a downturn, namely the ability to better adapt to
more turbulent demand conditions.35
One concern with these findings is the belief that in practice plant managers do not have
meaningful autonomy in decisions regarding sales and marketing and product introduction, and
that these decisions are typically undertaken in the marketing department of firm headquarters.
It is worth recalling that while this may be the case in business-to-consumer firms which sell
their goods to households directly or through retail establishments, it is less obvious in business-to-
business firms which sell their manufacturing output to other firms. The latter scenario encompasses
a significant share of manufacturing activity.36 Moreover, our firms are not so large - a median of
250 employees in WMS and 423 in MOPS so few of them are likely to have standalone marketing
divisions.
6 Alternative models and channels
6.1 Do bad times reduce the costs of decentralization?
We have argued that decentralized firms perform relatively well in bad times because the crisis was
accompanied by a spike in turbulence. There may, however, be alternative rationalizations of the
results we have presented and we probe these alternative channels. The model in Section 4 suggested
that bad times foster decentralization because of greater turbulence increasing the importance of
the plant manager’s local information. But the model can also rationalize the impact of a bad
shock through an alternative mechanism. Imagine, for example, that bad times reduce the costs
of decentralization because the plant manager fears that doing the non-profit maximizing action
34In the U.S. sample we have 3 questions capturing plant manager decentralization for hiring and investment deci-
sions in column (5) and 3 capturing plant manager decentralization for sales and marketing and product introduction
in column (6).
35Consistent with the previous sub-section Appendix Table A7 shows that the positive interaction between decen-
tralization and product churn is driven primarily by the sales and marketing and product introduction questions.
36According the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 34 percent of US manufacturing output was used as input for
other manufacturing firms in 2015 (https://www.bea.gov/industry/io annual.htm). The retail trade industry and
personal consumption expenditures, which represent business-to-consumer activity, also accounted for 34 percent of
manufacturing output in 2015.
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might cause the firm to go bankrupt. This could be interpreted as a lower cost to the principal of
the private action of the manager, i.e. a lower value of k . One can show that:
Proposition 2. A bad shock which reduces k , also increases profitability for decentralized
firms, that is:
@ ⇧
@k
< 0
This follows from the fact that @ ⇧@k = (↵  1)P (u) < 0 .
The intuition behind proposition 2 is that the risks of bankruptcy rise in bad times, so the plant
manager is more fearful of taking actions that deviate too much from the profit-maximizing action,
as she may lose her job. Hence, bad times may e↵ectively reduce the agency problem (i.e. reduces
k ) and so make decentralization less costly.
To test this idea we examine environments where the firm-specific risk of bankruptcy rose
rapidly in the Great Recession. We constructed several indicators of increased bankruptcy risk.
For example, we used the measures of exogenous increases in exposure to financial crisis exploited by
Chodorow-Reich (2014) such as exposure to mortgage-backed securities (a↵ected by the sub-prime
crisis) and a firm’s pre-existing relationship with Lehman Brothers or similar “at-risk” banks. These
are pre-Great Recession conditions relating to the supply of finance rather than product demand.
We also used more conventional measures such as leverage ratios.
We found that these measures do predict negative performance in sales and other outcomes
(see Appendix Table A8) as in Chodorow-Reich (2014). However, in no case did including these
bankruptcy risk variables (and their interactions with SHOCK or other covariates) materially alter
the coe cient on the key interaction of Decentralization ⇤ SHOCK when included in equation
(2).37 This led us to conclude that the crisis was not leading to greater decentralization by fostering
greater alignment between the central headquarters and plant manager.
6.2 The role of co-ordination costs
When there are large externalities between di↵erent plants belonging to the same firm, decentral-
ization is likely to be more costly. For example, coordinating prices and product decisions from
the central headquarters is important if one plant’s products cannibalize those of other plants. To
examine whether our results may reflect the importance of di↵erences in coordination in bad times,
in Tables A9 and A10 we included interactions with many measurable characteristics reflecting en-
vironments where coordination costs should be more important. These included size and whether
a firm was multi-plant (so more need for coordination) and, if so, whether these plants are located
in di↵erent countries or di↵erent states. Similarly, we looked at whether a firm was producing
goods across multiple sectors or whether it was part of a foreign multinational enterprise. We
also considered the degree of outsourcing. In all cases the interactions were insignificant and the
37The coe cients on the Lehman Brothers variable cannot be reported due to Census disclosure rules.
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main interaction between decentralization and export growth remained significant. We find this
unsurprising. The “Tsarist” view we sketched in the introduction suggested that recessions would
increase the need for centralization for firms where coordination costs were high (and therefore put
decentralized firms at a disadvantage).
6.3 Changes in decentralization over time
Recall that our identification assumption is that pre-recession decentralization is weakly exogenous
and that there are some adjustment costs which mean that after the Great Recession shock firms
do not immediately adopt the new optimal (more decentralized) organizational form. A corollary of
our theory, however, is that firms will start moving to a more decentralized form (to the extent that
they believe the shock is likely to be long-lasting). Hence, we should expect to see some increase
in decentralization for firms more exposed to the shock.
Table A11 examines this by using the change in decentralization as a dependent variable. This
is a demanding specification, especially for WMS where the panel element of decentralization is
limited (we have data in 2009 and 2010 for a sub-sample of the 2006 wave). Nevertheless, in both
WMS and MOPS we do see a significant and positive relationship between the size of the negative
shock and decentralization.
7 Conclusion
When does decentralizing power from the central headquarters to plant managers increase firm
growth? We examine the responses of a panel of 1,300 firms in 10 OECD countries (WMS), and
8,700 plants in the US (MOPS) to the Great Recession which reduced demand across industries
and countries in heterogeneous ways. Using pre-recession data on decentralization we find that
negative demand shocks hurt firm growth in centralized firms significantly more than in their
decentralized counterparts. This is true whether we use industry by country export shocks, or
exogenous predictors of these negative shocks like product durability.
We formalized a simple model where the CEO considers decentralizing product-related decisions
to the plant manager. The increased turbulence that comes with bad times makes the importance of
the plant manager’s local information more valuable and so means decentralized firms will perform
relatively better in unexpected downturns. Consistent with this model, we show that the correlation
between decentralization and firm performance during the crisis is stronger in industries which
experienced a greater increase in product churn and stock market volatility. This is consistent with
the idea that decentralization mattered the most in industries with greater increase in turbulence.
As we discussed above, the e↵ects are not trivial in size at the micro level, but we can also perform
some very rough calculations at the macro level (see Appendix B and Table A12 for details). We
estimate how much of the post crisis di↵erences in GDP growth performance across countries are
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related to the di↵erent levels of pre-crisis decentralization. Under this view, the fact that the US had
relatively more decentralized (and therefore flexible) firms meant that it could weather the global
economic storm better than many more centralized countries. Assuming the financial crisis was a
common cross country negative shock, we can trace out the implied post shock growth performance
depending on each nation’s average decentralization. We calculate that greater decentralization in
the US could account for about 16% of the U.S. superior GDP growth post 2012-2007 compared
to the other OECD countries in our sample.
We see our paper as a first attempt to unravel the relationship between growth and the internal
organization of firms using micro data with observable measures of decentralization. Many papers
have speculated on this issue without a systematic theory linked to rich survey data. There are
many directions to take the research. First, we need to look at the ways in which, in the longer-run,
firms change their organizational forms. For example, as the e↵ects of the Great Recession recede,
how will the growth e↵ects and degree of decentralization change? Second, we would like to go
deeper into the relation between the debt structure of companies (and so their bankruptcy risk)
and the incentives for firms to change. Finally, it would be valuable to examine the macro-economic
implications of our modeling framework in more detail. Do the e↵ects we identify matter in terms of
thinking about business cycles and how economies and companies can be resilient to these adverse
events?
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Figure 1: Changes in Sales by Shock and Decentralization
Figure 1 - Change in Sales by Shock and Decentralization
Panel A - WMS data
Panel B - MOPS data
Notes: Panel A used WMS firm data from 10 OECD countries. In Panel A the bars plot
annualized average of three-year firm-level change in ln(sales) over 2009-06, 2010-07, and
2011-07. 95% confidence interval bands reported. "Export Shock" is whether firms were in a
country-industry cell that experienced a drop in exports in 2008 and 2009 (the main Great
Recession years) compared to 2006 and 2007 (the latest pre-Recession years). Right hand side
bars are sectors were the shock was worst. Firms are split into whether they are decentralized
(above the overall mean of decentralization in 2006) or centralized. Sample size in each bar in
Panel A (from left to right) is (1) 695 observation over 296 firms; (2) 863 obs, 352 firms; (3)
736 obs, 316 firms; (4) 857 obs, 367 firms. Panel B is the same as Panel A except we just use
one 2009-06 long difference for plant sales growth. The sample in Panel B includes 8,774 US
plants in 3,147 firms.
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Notes: Panel A uses WMS firm data from 10 OECD countries. In Panel A the bars plot annualized average of
three-year firm-level change in ln(sales) over 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06. 95% confidence interval bands reported.
”Export Shock” is whether firms were in a country-industry cell that experienced a drop in exports in 2008 and 2009
(the main Great Recession years) compared to 2006 and 2007 (the latest pre-Recession years). Right hand side bars
are industry-country cells were the shock was worst. Firms are split into whether they are decentralized (above the
overall mean of decentralization in 2006) or centralized. Sample size in each bar in Panel A (from left to right) is (1)
695 observation over 296 firms; (2) 863 obs, 352 firms; (3) 736 obs, 316 firms; (4) 857 obs, 367 firms. Panel B is the
same as Panel A except we just use one 2009-06 long di↵erence f r plant sales growth and decentral zation dated in
2005. The sample in Panel B includes 8,774 US plants in 3,147 firms.
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Figure 2: E↵ect of Increase in Decentralization on Sales Growth
Panel A
Panel B
Figure 2 - Effect of increase in decentralization on sales growth 
Notes: Panel A plots the implied marginal effect of decentralization on firm
sales growth using the coefficients in Table 2 column (2) as a function of the
shock (export growth in cell). Panel B shows the distribution of firms in
industry-country cells with different levels in cell). Panel B shows the
distribution of firms in industry-country cells with different levels of export
growth before and after the Recession.
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Notes: WMS Data. Panel A plots the implied marginal e↵ect of decentralization on firm sales growth using the
coe cients in Table 2 column (2) as a function of the shock (export growth in cell). Panel B shows the distribution of
firms in industry-country cells with di↵erent levels in cell). Panel B shows the distribution of firms in industry-country
cells with di↵erent levels of export growth before and after the Great Recession.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Panel A World Management Survey
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Sales Levels ($Millions) 184.14 67.07 513.41
Sales Growth (3 years annualized log change) -6.38 -5.81 13.31
Employment (firm) 574.39 250.00 2,144.77
Employment (plant) 232.93 150.00 254.36
% Employees with a College Degree 16.32 10.00 17.51
Decentralization Score 0.00 -0.04 1.00
Exports (continuous, % change in sector/country export in 08/09 relative to 06/07) -1.96 -0.43 20.96
Durability (continuous, median years of service of goods produced in the industry) 13.03 10.00 19.50
Panel B U.S. Census Data - MOPS
Variable Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation
Sales Levels (2009) ($Millions) 137.40 50.50 403.60
Sales Growth (3 years annualized log change) -7.09 -6.06 18.44
Employment (firm) 1,354 423.3 2,812
Employment (plant) 249.81 135.00 481.91
% Employees with a College Degree 11.84 7.28 11.69
Decentralization Score 0.00 -0.17 1.00
Exports (continuous, % change in sector/country export in 08/09 relative to 06/07) 2.45 -0.82 15.95
Durability (continuous, median years of service of goods produced in the industry) 12.98 12.20 13.17
Notes: These are the regression samples used in Table 2. Panel A contains descriptive statistics from the WMS and
Panel B from the MOPS.
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Table 2: Decentralization and Sales Growth - Main resultsTable 2 - Decentralization and Sales Growth - Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable = Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.579* 0.363 0.041 -0.460 0.570** -0.182
(0.302) (0.302) (0.417) (0.572) (0.225) (0.234)
EXPORT Growth 0.069** 0.062**
(0.029) (0.029)
Decent.*EXPORT Growth -0.042*** -0.047** -0.035**
(0.013) (0.018) (0.015)
Decent.*DURABILITY 0.502** 0.381***
(0.194) (0.091)
Firms 1,330 1,330 1,330 1,330 3,147 3,147
Observations 3,151 3,151 3,151 3,151 8,774 8,774
Controls
Industry by country dummies Yes Yes Yes
Firm & plant employment, skills Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
World Management Survey (WMS) U.S. Census Data (MOPS)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level in columns (1)-
(3) and just industry in columns (4)-(6). The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-
06 are pooled in WMS (columns (1)-(4)) and just 2009-06 in MOPS (columns (5) and (6)). Decentralization measured in 2006 for WMS and 2005
for MOPs. "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main Great
Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include three digit industry (four digit in
column (4)), country and year dummies and "noise controls" (plant manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score,
day of the week and duration, WMS also includes analyst dummies and MOPS whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant
size are ln(employment) are skills is the ln(% of employees with a college degree).
Notes: *si ificant at 10%; * 5%; *** 1% level. Estimate by OLS with standard er ors l ster d at three-digit
industry by country pairs. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). 2011-
08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 are pooled in WMS ( olumns (1)-(4)) and just 2009-06 in MOPS (columns (5) d (6)).
Decentralization measured in 2006 for WMS and 2005 for MOPS. ”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln(exports) in
country by three digit i dustry cell between the 2008 nd 2009 averag (th m in Great Recession years) com red
to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include three digit industry (four digit
in column (4)), country and year dummies and ”noise controls” (plant manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority
and the interview’s reliability score, day of the week and duration); WMS also includes analyst dummies and MOPS
whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills is the
ln(percent of employees with a college degree).
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Table 3: Alternative Firm Level OutcomesTable 3 - Alternative Firm Perform nc  outcomes 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable Sales growth TFP growth Profit 
growth
Survival Sales growth TFP 
growth
Profit 
growth
Decentralization -0.017 -0.263 -0.396 1.33 0.570** -0.082 0.192
(0.400) (0.357) (1.597) (0.913) (0.225) (0.164) (0.270)
Decent.*EXPORT Growth -0.048*** -0.033** -0.068 -0.086* -0.035** -0.028** -0.042**
(0.017) (0.013) (0.065) (0.047) (0.015) (0.011) (0.019)
Firms 1,211 1,211 1,192 2,663 3,147 3,147 3,147
Observations 2,839 2,839 2,712 2,663 8,774 8,774 8,774
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level
in columns (1)-(3) and just industry in columns (5)-(7). Sales growth is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). TFP growth
is the same as sales growth except we include the growth of employment, capital and materials on the right hand side of the regression.
Profit growth is EBIT/capital for WMS and gross profits/capital for MOPS (profits measured as plant sales - wage bill - materials -
rental expenses). For all these dependent variable we pool the long difference 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 in WMS and just 2009-
2006 in MOPS). Survival is equal to 1 if the firm survived after 2008 and 0 if it exited to bankruptcy. Decentralization measured in
2006 for WMS and 2005 for MOPS. "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the
2008 and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All
columns include three digit industry by country and year dummies and controls for firm and plant size, skills and "noise" controls. 
World Management Survey (WMS) U.S. Census Data (MOPS)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit
industry by country. Sales growth is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). TFP growth is the same
as sales growth except we include the growth of employment, capital and materials on the right hand side of the
regression. Profit growth is EBIT/capital for WMS and gross profi s/capit l for MOPS (w ere profits are measured
as plant sales - wage bill - materials - rental expenses). For all these dependent variables we pool the long di↵erence
2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 in WMS and just 2009-2006 in MOPS). Survival is equal to 1 if the firm survived after
2007 and 0 if it exited to bankruptcy. Decentralization measured in 2006 for WMS and 2005 for MOPS. ”EXPORT
Growth” is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main
Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average ( he latest pre-Rece sion years). All columns include
three digit industry by country dummies and year dummies and controls for firm and plant size, skills and ”noise”
controls.
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Table 4: Placebo TestTable 4 - Placebo Tests 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable:
Sample Year<=2005 Year>=2006 All Year<=2005 Year>=2006 All
Decentralization 0.221 0.041 0.365 -0.117 -0.263 0.038
(0.334) (0.417) (0.310) (0.306) (0.357) (0.262)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth 0.005 -0.047** 0.004 0.004 -0.033** 0.004
(0.017) (0.018) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012)
POST*EXPORT Growth 0.089*** 0.115***
(0.024) (0.021)
POST*Decentralization -0.389 -0.387
(0.427) (0.350)
POST*Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.052*** -0.036**
(0.019) (0.016)
Firms 1,080 1,330 1,330 991 1,211 1,211
Observations 3,664 3,151 6,815 3,265 2,839 6,104
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty
Sales Growth TFP Growth 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level.
Sales growth is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). TFP growth is the same as sales growth except we include the growth
of employment, capital and materials on the right hand side of the regression. For columns (2) and (5) we use long differences 2011-08,
2010-07 and 2009-06 and in columns (1) and (4) we use long differences 2008-05, 2007-04, 2006-03 and 2005-02. Columns (3) and (6)
pool all these long differences together. "POST" is a dummy taking value 1 in all years after 2006 included. Firm and plant
employment are measured in 2006."EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008
and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All
columns include dummies for year and for three digit industry by country pairs, and controls for firm and plant size, skills and "noise"
(plant manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and duration and analyst
dummies). 
Notes: *signific at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estima ed by OLS with stand rd rrors clustered at three-digit
industry by country level. Sales growth is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). TFP growth is the same
as sales growth except we include the growth of employment, capital and materials on the right hand side of the
regression. For columns (2) and (5) we use long di↵erences 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 and in columns (1) and (4)
we use long di↵erences 2008- 5, 2007-04, 2006-03 and 2005-02. Columns (3) and (6) pool all th se long di↵erences
together. ”POST” is a dummy taking value 1 in all years after 2006 included. Firm and plant employment are
measured in 2006.”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the
2008 and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-
Recession years). All columns include dummies for year and for three digit industry by country pairs, and controls for
firm and plant size, skills and ”noise” (plant manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview’s reliability
score, day of the week and duration and analyst dummies).
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Table 5: Instrumenting Decentralization with Trust around the Plant’s HQTable 5  - Instrumenting Decentralization with trust around the plant's HQ
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Baseline on 
subsample
Reduced form First Stage First Stage Second Stage
Dependent Variable Sales growth Sales growth Decentralization Decentralization
* Export Growth
Sales growth
Decentralization 0.042 0.076
(0.339) (3.023)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.042** -0.298**
(0.017) (0.125)
Trust -2.926 1.374*** 7.448
(4.066) (0.394) (8.709)
Trust*EXPORT Growth -0.470*** 0.015 1.408**
(0.164) (0.022) (0.529)
Observations 2,990 2,990 2,990 2,990 2,990
Angrist Pischke Test  (Weak identification) 8.53 5.52
Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic 16.72
Cluster HQ Region HQ Region HQ Region HQ Region HQ Region
Notes: WMS Data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%.  All columns estimated by OLS except column (5) which is IV. Standard errors clustered 
at region where the firm's HQ is located. Sales growth is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). Trust is the mean of the response in 
the world values survey to the question that in general, most people can be trusted in the region around the headquarters of the firm. We use this 
variable (and its interaction with export growth) as instrumental variables. All columns include dummies for year and for three digit industry by 
country pairs, and controls for firm and plant size, skills and "noise" (plant manager's tenure and  hierarchical seniority and the interview's 
reliability score, day of the week and duration and analyst dummies). 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. WMS data. All columns estimated by OLS except column (5)
which is IV. Standard errors clustered by the region where the firm’s HQ is located. Sales growth is the annualized
three-year chang of firm ln(sales). Trust is the mean of the response in the world values surv y to the question
that in general, most people can be trusted in the region around the headquarters of the firm. We use this variable
(and its interaction with export growth) as instrumental variables in column (5). All columns include dummies for
year and for three digit industry by country pairs, and controls for firm and plant size, skills and ”noise” (plant
manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview’s reliability score, day of the week and duration and
analyst dummies).
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Table 6: Decentralization and Turbulence (as measured by Product Churn)Table 7 - Decentralization and Product Churn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Sales growth ('07-'12)
Decentralization 0.480*** 0.491*** 0.576*** -0.004 0.491*** 0.322
(0.142) (0.130) (0.133) (0.209) (0.130) (0.201)
Decentralization*Change in Product Churn 0.994*** 0.886*** 0.994*** 0.930***
(0.300) (0.320) (0.300) (0.298)
Decentralization*Export Growth ('07-'12) -0.014** -0.008
(0.007) (0.007)
Decentralization*Durability 0.147* 0.082
(0.086) (0.081)
Observations 8,243 8,243 8,243 8,243 8,243 8,243
Exports Durability
Notes: MOPS data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level. The
dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales) 2012-07 Decentralization measured in 2005. "EXPORT Growth" is
change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared
to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include three digit industry dummies, firm and plant size, skills
and "noise controls" (plant manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and duration,
and whether the survey was answered online or by mail). "PRODUCT CHURN" is the three digit industry of value of the average change in
the (number of products added between t and t-5 plus the number products dropped between t and t-5)/(average number of products between
t and t-5). 
Notes: *signific nt at 10%; ** 5 ; ** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustere at three-digit
industry. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales) 2012-07 Decentralization
measured in 2005. ”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the
2008 and 2009 average (the main G at Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the lates pre-
Recession years). All columns include three digit industry dummies, firm and plant size, skills and ”noise controls”
(plant manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview’s reliability score, day of the week and duration,
and whether the survey was answered online or by mail). ”PRODUCT CHURN” is the three digit industry of value
of the average change in the (number of products added between t and t-5 plus the number products dropped between
t and t-5)/(average number of products between t and t-5).
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Table 7: Decentralization and Turbulence (as measured by Stock Market Volatility)Table 8 - Decentralization and Uncertainty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable = Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.208 0.421 0.289 0.3603 0.3076 0.3115
(0.331) (0.329) (0.321) (0.266) (0.218) (0.218)
EXPORT Growth 0.088*** 0.090***
(0.032) (0.027)
Decent*EXPORT Growth -0.034** -0.024* -0.030** -0.027*
(0.017) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Decent.*Change in SD(stock returns) 7.142*** 6.304*** 24.36*** 23.20***
(1.341) (2.354) (9.200) (8.508)
Firms 1,330 1,330 1,330 3,147 3,147 3,147
Observations 3,151 3,151 3,151 8,774 8,774 8,774
Controls
Industry dummies Yes (SIC2) Yes (SIC2) Yes (SIC2) Yes Yes Yes
Firm & plant employment, skills Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SIC2*Cty SIC2*Cty SIC2*Cty SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
World Management Survey U.S. Census Data (MOPS)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year 
change of firm ln(sales) in 2009-06. Decentralization measured in 2005. "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average 
(the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). "Change in SD(stock returns)" is the change in standard deviation of 
stock returns in three digit industry cell between 2008 and 2009 average compared to 2006. "Change in Log(SD(stock returns))" is defined analgously using the log of the standard 
deviation. All columns include three digit industry dummies and "noise controls" (plant manager's tenure and  hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the 
week and duration, and whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills is the ln(% of employees with a college degree).
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm
ln(sales) in 2009-06. ”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln( xp rts) in thr e digit industry cell between the 2008 and
2009 average (the main Great Recessio years) com ared to he 2006 nd 2007 average (the latest p e-Recession
years). Columns (1)-(3): estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at two-digit industry by country level.
”Change in SD(stock returns)” is the change in standard deviation of stock returns in two digit industry by country
cell between 2008 and 2009 average compared to 2006. These columns include two digit industry by country dummies.
Columns (4)-(6) estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level. ”Change in SD(stock
returns)” is the change in standard deviation of stock returns in three digit industry cell between 2008 and 2009
average compared to 2006. These columns include three digit industry dummies. All columns include the same set
of noise and firm controls used in Table 2.
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Table 8: Di↵erences Across Decentralization QuestionsTable 6 - Differences across decentralization questions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.041 0.570**
(0.417) (0.225)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.047** -0.035**
(0.018) (0.015)
Decentralization - Hiring & Investment 0.063 0.830***
(0.396) (0.258)
Decentralization - Hiring & Investment*EXPORT Growth -0.002 -0.005
(0.019) (0.015)
Decentralization  - Sales & New Products -0.135 0.387
(0.379) (0.240)
Decentralization  - Sales & New Products -0.060*** -0.045***
*EXPORT Growth (0.017) (0.016)
Firms 1,330 1,330 1,330 3,147 3,147 3,147
Observations 3,151 3,151 3,151 8,774 8,774 8,774
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
World Management Survey (WMS) U.S. Census Data  (MOPS)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level in columns (1)-(3)
and just industry in columns (4)-(6). The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). 2011-08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 are
pooled in WMS (columns (1)-(4)) and just 2009-2006 in MOPS (columns (5) and (6)). Decentralization measured in 2006 for WMS and 2005 for
MOPS. "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main Great
Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include three digit industry, country and year
dummies and "noise controls" (plant manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and duration,
WMS also includes analyst dummies and MOPS whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills
is the ln(% of employees with a college degree). "Decentralization - Hiring & Investment" is the z-scored average of the z-scored measures of plant
manager autonomy in hiring and capital investments (and also pay increases in the MOPS data). "Decentralization - Sales & New Products" is average
for product introduction and marketing. 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit
industry by cou try level. The ependent var able is th annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales). 2011-
08, 2010-07 and 2009-06 are pooled in WMS (columns (1)-(3)) and just 2009-2006 in MOPS (columns (4) to (6)).
Decentralization measured in 2006 for WMS and 2005 for MOPS. ”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln(exports) in
country by three digi industry cell be ween the 2008 and 2009 verage (the main Great Recession y ars) compared
to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include three digit industry, country and
year dummies, size, skills and “noise controls”.
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Web Appendices
A Data Appendix
A.1 Industry-level variables
A.1.1 Exports
We measure changes in exports in an industry by country cell using the UN COMTRADE database of world trade.
This is an international database of six-digit product level information on all bilateral imports and exports between
any given pairs of countries. We first aggregate the COMTRADE value of export data (in US dollars)from its original
six-digit product level to three-digit US SIC-1987 level using the Pierce and Schott (2010) concordance. We deflate
the industry and country specific export value series by a country and year specific CPI from the World Bank (2010
base year) to measure “real exports.” The Export growth variable is defined as the logarithmic change in exports in
2008-09 (the average in a cell across these two Great Recession years) relative to 2006-07 (the average across the two
years immediately prior to the Great Recession). The real export growth variable is winsorized at the 5th and the
95th percentile.
A.1.2 Durability
Data on the average durability of the goods produced in the industry are drawn from Ramey and Nekarda (2013).
This is a continuous cross-sectional measure at the 4-digit industry level.
A.1.3 Bartik Instrument
The Bartik IV for export growth in a country-industry cell is constructed as the change in world import demand
(WID) for commodity m in country r between time and t (2008 and 2009) and t  1 (2006 and 2007), is defined as:
4zmr,t =
X
p
smpr,t 1 ⇤ 4WIDmpr0,t
where smpr,t 1 denotes the share of exports of commodity m from country r to partner country p at time t   1;
WIDmpr0,t is the log change in total imports of commodity c in partner country p between t and t   1 from all
countries excluding country r (hence the r’ sub-script). Consider, for example, the Bartik IV for changes in US
exports of anti-ulcer drugs. For a given partner, like the UK, we calculate the share of all American anti-ulcer drugs
exported that were exported to the UK in t  1 , sdrugs,UK,US,07 06, and then multiply this by the change in the
imports of anti-ulcer drugs into the UK from every country (except the US),4WIDdrugs,UK,US0,09 08. This is a
prediction of what the demand for US exports to the UK will be coming from exogenous world demand (rather than
US specific factors). We repeat this for every country in the world (not just the UK) and then sum over all the US
partner countries in the world.
Commodity m is measured at the 6-digit level of the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System
(HS). Commodity level measures are then mapped into Industry j three-digit Standard Industry Classification (SIC)
codes using the Pierce and Schott (2010) concordance.
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A.2 World Management Survey (WMS) International Data
A.2.1 Firm-level Accounting Databases
Our sampling frame was based on the Bureau van Dijk (BVD) ORBIS which is composed of the BVD Amadeus
dataset for Europe (France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom); BVD Icarus for the
United States, BVD Oriana for Japan. These databases all provide su cient information on companies to conduct
a stratified telephone survey (company name, address, and a size indicator). These databases also typically have
accounting information on employment, sales and assets. Apart from size, we did not insist on having accounting
information to form the sampling population, however. Amadeus are constructed from a range of sources, primarily
the National registries of companies (such as Companies House in the United Kingdom). Icarus is constructed from
the Dun & Bradstreet database, which is a private database of over 5 million U.S. trading locations built up from
credit records, business telephone directories, and direct research. Oriana is constructed from the Teikoku Database
in Japan.The full WMS consists of 34 countries but because we need decentralization data in 2006 we are restricted
to the 12 countries surveyed in the 2006 wave. Because we wanted to focus on mature economies we dropped China
and India which left us with 10 OECD countries (France, Great Britain, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland,
Portugal, Sweden and the US).
A.2.2 The Organizational Survey
In every country the sampling frame for the organization survey was all firms with a manufacturing primary industry
code with between 50 and 5,000 employees on average over the most recent three years of data. Interviewers were each
given a randomly selected list of firms from the sampling frame. More details are available in Bloom, Sadun and Van
Reenen (2012) where we compare the sampling frame with Census demographic data from each country and show
that the sample is broadly representative of medium sized manufacturing firms. We also analyzed sample selection -
the response rate was 45% and respondents appear random with respect to company performance, although larger
firms where slightly more likely to respond. We collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself
(number and type of prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and day-of-the-
week), on the manager (gender, seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and external employment
experience, and location), and on the interviewer (we can include individual “analyst” fixed e↵ects, time-of-day, and
subjective reliability score). We used a subset of these “noise controls” (see text) to help reduce residual variation.
In analyzing organizational surveys across countries we also have to be extremely careful to ensure comparability
of responses. One step was the team all operated from two large survey rooms in the London School of Economics.
Every interviewer also had the same initial three days of interview training, which provided three “calibration”
exercises, where the group would all score a role-played interview and then discuss scoring together of each question.
This continued throughout the survey, with one calibration exercise every Friday afternoon as part of the weekly
group training sessions. Finally, the analysts interviewed firms in multiple countries since they all spoke their native
language plus English, so interviewers were able to interview firms from their own country plus the UK and US,
enabling us to remove interviewer fixed e↵ects.
The construction of the degree of decentralization measures (from Central Headquarters to Plant Manager) is
discussed in some detail in the text. The questions are addressed to the plant manager. We only keep observations
where at least two of the four decentralization questions were answered (and we include a control for the number of
non-missing questions in the set of noise controls). We drop observations where the plant manager is also the CEO
(5% of firms). In cases were the Central Headquarters is on the same site as the plant we interviewed we add a
dummy variable to indicate this (one of the noise controls) to reflect potentially greater monitoring. We use the data
from the 2006 wave in all cases except when we analyze changes in decentralization as an outcome where we exploit
the fact that we ran another wave in 2009 and 2010 for a sub-sample of firms.
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As a check of potential survey bias and measurement error we performed repeat interviews on 72 firms in 2006,
contacting di↵erent managers in di↵erent plants at the same firm, using di↵erent interviewers. To the extent that our
organizational measure is truly picking up company-wide practices these two scores should be correlated, while to
the extent the measure is driven by noise the measures should be independent. The correlation of the first interview
against the second interviews was 0.513 (p-value of 0.000), with no obvious (or statistically significant) relationship
between the degree of measurement error and the decentralization score. That is to say, firms that reported very low
or high decentralization scores in one plant appeared to be genuinely very centralized or decentralized in their other
plants, rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement error.
A.2.3 Firm-level variables
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital (fixed assets), profits and intermediate inputs came from
BVD ORBIS. Whether the variable is reported depends on the accounting standards in di↵erent countries. Sales are
deflated by a three digit industry producer price index. BVD has extensive information on ownership structure, so
we can use this to identify whether the firm was part of a multinational enterprise. We also asked specific questions
on the multinational status of the firm (whether it owned plants aboard and the country where the parent company
is headquartered) to be able to distinguish domestic multinationals from foreign multinationals.
We collected many other variables through our survey including information on plant size, skills, organization,
etc. as described in the main text. We also collected management practices data in the survey. These were scored
following the methodology of Bloom and Van Reenen (2007), with practices grouped into four areas: operations
(three practices), monitoring (five practices), targets (five practices), and incentives (five practices). The shop-floor
operations section focuses on the introduction of lean manufacturing techniques, the documentation of processes
improvements, and the rationale behind introductions of improvements. The monitoring section focuses on the
tracking of performance of individuals, reviewing performance, and consequence management. The targets section
examines the type of targets, the realism of the targets, the transparency of targets, and the range and interconnection
of targets. Finally, the incentives section includes promotion criteria, pay and bonuses, and fixing or firing bad
performers, where best practice is deemed the approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and
e↵ort. Our management measure uses the unweighted average of the z-scores of all 18 dimensions.
Our basic industry code is the U.S. SIC (1997) three digit level—which is our common industry definition in all
countries. We allocate each firm to its main three digit sector (based on sales).
A.3 U.S. Census Bureau Data: MOPS
A.3.1 Sample
Table A2 shows how our sample is derived from the universe of U.S. business establishments. The U.S. Census
Bureau data on decentralization comes from the 2010 Management and Organizational Practices Survey (MOPS),
which was a supplement to the 2010 Annual Survey of Manufactures (ASM). The MOPS survey was sent to all ASM
establishments in the ASM mail-out sample. Overall, 49,782 MOPS surveys were successfully delivered, and 37,177
responses were received, yielding a response rate of 78%.
The MOPS contains 36 multiple choice questions, split into 3 modules: management practices (16 questions),
organization (13 questions), and background characteristics (7 questions). Decentralization measures come from
the “Organization” module of the MOPS. Only establishments with headquarters located o↵-site are instructed to
answer questions in the organization module. This reduces the sample to about 20,000 establishments. We also
require matches to the 2006 and 2009 ASM in order to calculate the growth rates used in the analysis. This reduces
the sample size substantially for two reasons. First, all of the establishments in our sample must have been operating
in both 2006 and 2009. The second reason is related to the ASM sample design. The ASM is a rotating 5-year panel
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which samples large establishments with certainty but also includes a random sample of smaller establishments. The
ASM sample is refreshed every five years, most recently in 2009, thus we lose establishments which were in the 2009
and 2010 ASM samples and responded to the MOPS, but were not in the 2006 ASM sample. Finally, we require that
respondents answer all 6 of the questions about decentralization (described below) and have positive value added and
imputed capital in 2010. The final sample contains 8,774 establishments and 3,147 firms.
A.3.2 Decentralization
Our measure of decentralization is constructed from 6 questions on the MOPS (questions 18 through 23), which
measure the allocation of real decision making rights between manufacturing plant managers and their central head-
quarters. Respondents are asked whether decisions about hiring, pay increases, product introductions, pricing, and
advertising are conducted at the establishment, headquarters or both, and about the largest capital expenditure
plant managers can make without authorization from headquarters. The survey asks about organizational prac-
tices in 2005 and 2010. We use information on decentralization in 2005 in the main analysis because firms may
endogenously respond to the crisis in 2010 by changing organizational structures.
Each of the 6 decentralization questions is normalized on a scale from zero to one, with one being most decentral-
ized and zero being least decentralized. For example, question 18 reads “In 2005 and 2010, where were decisions on
hiring permanent full-time employees made?” There are three possible responses: “Only at this establishment” which
is assigned the value one; “Both at this establishment and at headquarters” which is assigned a value of one-half;
“Only at headquarters” which is assigned a value of zero. We then standardize each question to have a mean equal
to zero and standard deviation equal to one, take the mean over all six standardized questions, and then standardize
this mean so that it has a mean equal to zero and standard deviation equal to one.
A.3.3 Product Churn
Product churn is constructed using data come from the US Census Bureau’s Census of Manufactures (CM). The CM
asks establishments to list the dollar value of annual shipments by 10-digit product code. Establishments receive a list
of all the product codes typically produced by establishments in their industry, along with corresponding descriptions
of each code.
We start by calculating the total number of 10-digit products by each establishment in a given year, as well
as the number of added products and the number of dropped products for each establishment compared to the
previous CM 5 years earlier. This of course restricts the sample to manufacturing establishments which were alive
five years earlier. We further restrict the sample by dropping establishments producing fewer than 3 products in
both Censuses. Product churn at the establishment level is measured as the number of products added or dropped
between the previous Census and the current Census, divided by the average number of products produced in both
Censuses. That is, product churn for establishment i in year t is defined as:
Product Churn i,t =
Products Added i,t + Products Dropped i,t
0.5 (# Products i,t +# Products i,t 5)
Industry product churn in year t is the average establishment-level product churn amongst establishments within
an industry (three digit US SIC-1987). To calculate industry-level change in product churn, we simply subtract
product churn in 2007 (constructed from the product data in the 2002 and 2007 Censuses) from product churn in
2012.
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A.3.4 ASM variables
Directly from the ASM we obtain material inputs, shipments (deflated by a three digit price deflator) as our sales
measure and the headcount of employees for labor. Real capital stocks are constructed using the perpetual inventory
method, following the methodology in Bloom et al. (2014). In particular, we combine detailed data on the book
value of assets every 5 years from the CM with annual investment data from the ASM. We first convert CM capital
stocks from book to market value using BEA fixed asset tables. We then deflate capital stocks and investment using
industry-year price indices from the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database. Finally, we apply the perpetual
inventory method, using the formula Kt = (1  t)Kt 1+It . This procedure is done separately for structures and for
equipment. However, since the ASM contains investment broken down into investment in equipment and investment
in structures, but the CM does not break down capital stocks into these two components, we must apportion plant
capital stocks into each component. We do this by assigning the share of capital stock to equipment and structures
which matches the share of investment in equipment and structures.
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B Magnitudes
In Table A12 we consider some simple calculations of cross-country magnitudes. Our thought experiment is to
consider the Great Recession as a global shock as reflected by a fall in trade. We use the US value of the shock from
COMTRADE of a fall in exports of 7.7 percent. This is the empirical di↵erence between 2009-08 vs. 2007-06 that
we use as our industry-country specific shock measure elsewhere in the paper.
We take the 2006 average levels of cross-country decentralization by country (column (1) of Table A12) and
the empirical estimates in column (2) of Table 2 to estimate the average annual implied e↵ect of GDP of the shock
(column (2) of Table A12). We express this relative to the US in column (3). For all countries except Sweden there
is a negative relative implied e↵ect because decentralization in the US is greater than every other country except
Sweden. Column (4) displays the actual annual change in GDP growth since the start of the global financial crisis
(from World Bank data) for each of our countries and then again expresses these relative to the US base in column (5).
Every country except Poland (which is still in a strong catch-up phase of development) experienced a slower growth
performance than the US over this period, averaging just over a third of a percentage point (base of column). Column
(6) divides the column (3) into column (5) which is the fraction of relative economic performance accounted for by
decentralization (note that since we are assuming a common shock, none of this di↵erence is due to the magnitude
of the crisis being worse in some countries than others).
Overall, column (6) of Table A12 suggests that an average of 16% of the post-crisis growth experience between
countries is accounted for by decentralization. This is non-trivial as mentioned in the text, but it is worth noting
that there is a large degree of heterogeneity between countries underneath this average. Almost all of the di↵erential
growth experience of France and Japan compared to the US can be accounted for by decentralization (96% and 95%
respectively), whereas decentralization accounts for virtually none of the UK’s performance. In particular, as noted
above, because Sweden is more decentralized than the US we should expect it to have outperformed the US, whereas
it grew about half a percentage point more slowly. If we drop Sweden, the importance of decentralization doubles to
accounting for almost a third of the di↵erence (32%). Note that the contribution is also negative for Poland, because
although Poland is more centralized than the US, it grew more quickly over this time period.
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Figure A1: Change in Industry/Country Exports and Sales before and after the Great RecessionFigure A1 - Changes in Industry/Country Exports and Sales before and after the Great Recession
Notes: Each bar plots the yearly percentage change in real manufacturing
exports. The countries included in the sample are France, Germany, Greece,
Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, UK and US.
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Notes: Each bar plots the yearly percentage change in real manufacturing exports. The countries included in the
sample are France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, UK and US.
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Figure A2: Average Decentralization Z-score by Quintile of Product Churn
Figure A2 - Average Decentralization Z-score by Quintile of Product Churn
Notes: MOPS data. Industry product churn is the average of plant product churn.
Plant product churn = (# products added from '02 to '07 + # products dropped from 
'02 and '07)/(0.5*# products produced in '02 + 0.5*# products produced in '07).
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Notes: MOPS data. Industry product churn is the average of plant product churn. Plant product churn = (#
products added from ’02 to ’07 + # products dropped from ’02 and ’07)/(0.5*# products produced in ’02 + 0.5*#
products produced in ’07).
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Figure A3: Change in Industry Product Churn and Export GrowthFigure A3 - Export Growth and Change in Industry Product Churn
Notes: Change in product churn is industry product churn in 2012 minus industry product churn in 2007.
Exports growth is the change in ln(exports) from 2007 to 2012. Both variables are winzorized at the 5th and
95th percentiles and measured at the level of the three-digit industry. Vingtiles plotted.
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Notes: MOPS data. Change in product churn is industry product churn in 2012 minus industry product churn in
2007. Exports growth is the change in ln(exports) from 2007 to 2012. Both variables are winzorized at the 5th and
95th perce tiles and measured at the level of the t ree-digit industry. Vingtiles plotted.
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Table A2: MOPS SamplingTable A2 -MOPS Sampling
Sample Source Sample Criteria
Number of 
establishments 
(in thousands)
Total 
employment 
(in thousands)
Average 
employment
(1) Universe of establishments LBD None 7,041 134,637 19.1
(2) Manufacturing LBD NAICS 31-33 298 12,027 40.4
(3) Annual Survey of Manufactures ASM
NAICS 31-33, and either over 500 employees, or in 
ASM random sample. Positive employment and sales, 
and tabbed 51 7,387 143.5
(4) MOPS respondents MOPS As in (3), also responded to MOPS 36 5,629 155.8
(5) ORG module respondents MOPS
As in (4), and responded to any of MOPS questions 18-
23 20 3,580 178.4
(6) Regression sample MOPS
As in (5), responded to all ORG "recall" questions, 
match to ASM 2006 and ASM 2009, positive value 
added and imputed capital in ASM 2010 9 2,135 243.3
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Table A3: Robustness of results to interactions of export growth with other firm-level variables in
WMS dataTable A4  - Robustness WMS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth 
Decentralization 0.041 -0.098 0.026 0.046 -0.241 0.044 -0.078
(0.417) (0.423) (0.416) (0.431) (0.451) (0.417) (0.424)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.047** -0.054*** -0.046** -0.043** -0.049** -0.047** -0.049**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019)
Management 0.977
(0.664)
Management*EXPORT Growth 0.042*
(0.025)
Log(% employees with a college degree)*EXPORT Growth 0.023
(0.038)
Workers' decentralization -0.038
(1.015)
Workers' decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.074*
(0.040)
Foreign Plant Manager 0.478
(2.293)
Foreign Plant Manager *EXPORT Growth 0.182***
(0.069)
Male Plant Manager -0.392
(1.662)
Male Plant Manager*EXPORT Growth 0.046
(0.052)
Plant Manager Age -3.687
(2.966)
Plant Manager Age*Export Growth -0.104
(0.093)
Observations 3,151 3,151 3,151 3,097 2,784 3,151 3,125
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level in all columns. Specifications 
are the same as Table 2 column (3) except augmented with additional variables from the WMS (linear and interacted with export growth). Management is the z-
scored average of 18 z-scored management questions (see Bloom and Van Reenen 2007 for details). "Log(% employees with a college degree)" is the natural
logarithm of the percent of employees with a bachelors degree. Worker decentralization is the z-scored average of 2 questions on worker autonomy. Foreign/Male
plant manager=1 if plant manager is from a foreign country or male, respectively.
Notes: WMS Data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered
at three-digit industry by cou try level in all columns. Specifications are the same as T ble 2 column (3) except
augmented with additional variables from the WMS (linear and interacted with export growth). Management is the
z-scored average of 18 z-scored management questions (see Bloom and Van Reenen 2007 for details). “Log(percentage
of employees with a college degree)” is the natural logarithm of the percent of employees with a bachelors degree.
Worker decentralization is the z-scored average of 2 questions on worker autonomy. Foreign/Male plant manager=1
if plant manager is from a foreign country or male, respectively.
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Table A4: Robustness of results to interactions of export growth with other firm-level variables in
MOPS dataTable A5 - Robustness in the U.S. Census Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.570** 0.710*** 0.703*** 0.700*** 0.687***
(0.225) (0.247) (0.247) (0.246) (0.243)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.035** -0.030** -0.030** -0.029** -0.029**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Management -0.272
(0.241)
Management*Export Shock 0.007
(0.014)
Data-Driven Decision-Making -0.350
(0.214)
Data-Driven Decision-Making*Export Shock 0.001
(0.015)
Log(% employees with a college degree)*EXPORT Growth -0.019
(0.015)
Union -1.767**
(0.713)
Union*Export Shock 0.063
(0.052)
Firms 3,147 3,147 3,147 3,147 3,147
Observations 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774
Cluster SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level in all
columns. The specification is the same as Table 2 column (5) except augmented with additional variables from the MOPS (linear and
interacted with export growth). Management is the z-scored average of 18 z-scored management questions (see Bloom et al. 2013 for
details). "Data-Driven Decision-Making" is the z-scored average of 2 questions on the use and availability of data in decision-making.
"Log(% employees with a college degree)" is the natural logarithm of the percent of employees with a bachelors degree. "Union" is the
percent of employees that are members of a labor union.
Notes: MOPS Data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at
three-digit industry level in all columns. Specifications are the same as Table 2 column (5) except augmented with
additional variables from the MOPS (linear and interacted with export growth). Management is the z-scored average
of 18 z-scored management questions (see Bloom e al. 2013 for details). “Da a-Driv n Decision-Making” is the
z-scored average of 2 questions on the use and availability of data in decision-making. “Log(percentage of employees
with a college degree)” is the natural logarithm of the percent of employees with a bachelors degree. “Union” is the
percentage of employees that are members of a labor union.
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Table A5: Robustness of results to interactions of Decentralization with other industry-level
variablesTable A6  - Decentralization and Growth - Robustness to controlling for other industry level interactions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable
Decentralization -0.492 -0.270 0.348 -0.282
(1.748) (2.408) (0.605) (1.460)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.039** -0.036** -0.040** -0.036**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Decentralization*Asset tangibility 2.167
(5.914)
Decentralization*Inventory/Sales 2.367
(14.911)
Decentralization*External finance dependency -0.777
(1.556)
Decentralization*Labor costs 2.128
(7.732)
Observations 3,132 3,132 3,132 3,132
Number of firms 1,545 1,545 1,545 1,545
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty
Sales Growth
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry by country level in all
columns. Specifications are the same as Table 2 column (3) except augmented with additional variables. "Asset Tangibility" is the ratio of
tangible assets, i.e. net property, plant and equipment, to total assets for the corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989,
computed at the ISIC 3 rev 1 level (inverse measure of credit constraints). "Inventory/Sales" is measured as the inventories to total sales for the
corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989 (measure of liquidity dependence). "External finance dependency" is measured as
capital expenditures minus cash flow divided by cash flow for the corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989 (measure of
credit constraint). "Labor costs" is measured as the total labour costs to total sales for the corresponding industry in the US over the period
1980-1989 (another measure of liquidity dependence).
Notes: WMS Data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered
at three-digit industry by country level in all columns. Specifications are the same as Table 2 column (3) except
augmented with additional variables. ”Asset Tangibility” is the ratio of tangible assets, i.e. net pr perty, plant and
equipment, to total assets for the corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989, computed at the ISIC
3 rev 1 level (inverse measure of credit constraints). ”Inventory/Sales” is measured as the inventories to total sales
for the corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989 (measure of liquidity dependence). ”External
finance dependency” is measured as capital expenditures minus cash flow divided by cash flow for the corresponding
industry in the US over the period 1980-1989 (measure of credit constraint). ”Labor costs” is measured as the total
labour costs to total sales for the corresponding industry in the US over the period 1980-1989 (another measure of
liquidity dependence).
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Table A6: Decentralization and Product Churn
Table A9 - Decentralization and Product Churn
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent Variable: Decentralization z-score
Decentralization Questions
Product Churn 0.016*** 0.016*** 0.004 0.008** 0.020*** 0.017***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Management -0.010*** 0.005 -0.019***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(% employees with a college degree) 0.057*** 0.044*** 0.049***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(plant employment) 0.035*** 0.056*** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
log(firm employment) -0.012*** -0.002 -0.016***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Observations 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774
Controls
Industry (SIC3) Yes Yes Yes
Noise Yes Yes Yes
Cluster SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
U.S. Census Data - MOPS
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level. The dependent
variable in columns (1) and (2) is overall decentralization z-score. The dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the z-scored average of
the z-scored measures of plant manager autonomy in hiring, capital investments, and pay raises. The dependent variable in columns (5) and
(6) is the z-scored average for product introduction and marketing questions. "Product Churn" is the three digit industry level value of the
average change in the (number of products added between t and t-5 plus the number products dropped between t and t-5)/(average number
of products between t and t-5).
All
Capital Expenditure, 
Hiring, and Raises
Product Introductions 
and  Sales and 
Marketing
Notes: MOPS Data. *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered
at thre -digit industry level. The d p dent variable in colum s (1) and (2) is overall decentralizati n z-score. The
dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is the z-scored average of the z-scored measures of plant manager autonomy
in hiring, capital investments, and pay raises. The dependent variable in columns (5) and (6) is the z-scored average
for product introduction and marketing questions. ”Product Churn” is the three digit industry level value of the
average change in the (number of products added between t and t-5 plus the number products dropped between t
and t-5)/(average number of products between t and t-5).
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Table A7: Decentralization and Product Churn, by type of DecentralizationTable A10 - Decentralization and Product Churn, By Type of Decentralization
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Decentralization of Sales, Marketing, and New Products
Dependent Variable: Sales growth ('12-'07)
Decentralization 0.198 0.191 0.304*
(0.147) (0.1518) (0.1622)
Decent*Change in Product Churn 1.859*** 1.587**
(0.370) (0.396)
Decent*Export Growth ('12-'07) -0.029** -0.011
(0.007) (0.008)
Decent*Durability
Firms 3,004 3,004 3,004
Observations 8,243 8,243 8,243
Panel A: Decentralization of Hiring & Investment
Dependent Variable: Sales growth ('12-'07)
Decentralization 0.682*** 0.692*** 0.743***
(0.169) (0.157) (0.166)
Decent*Change in Product Churn 0.604* 0.541
(0.330) (0.351)
Decent*Export Growth ('12-'07) -0.009 -0.004
(0.007) (0.008)
Decent*Durability
Firms 3,004 3,004 3,004
Observations 8,243 8,243 8,243
Cluster SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
Exports
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit industry level. The dependent
variable is the annualized five-year change of firm ln(sales), 2012-2007. The dependent variable in Panel A is the z-scored average of the
z-scored measures of plant manager autonomy in hiring, capital investments, and pay raises. The dependent variable in Panel B is the z-
scored average for product introduction and marketing questions. The variable Change in Product Churn" is measured by subtracting
2007-2002 industry product churn from 2012-2007 industry product churn. "EXPORT Growth" is the 20012-2007 change in ln(exports)
by three digit industry cell. All columns include three digit industry dummies and controls for firm and plant size, skills and "noise" (plant
manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and duration, whether the survey was
answered online or by mail).
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit
industry level. The dependent variable is the annualized five-year change of firm ln(sales), 2012-2007. The dependent
variable in Panel A is the z-scored average of the z-scored measures of plant manager autonomy in hiring, capital
investments, and ay raises. The dependent va iable in Panel B is the z-scored average for product i troduction
and marketing questions. The variable Change in Product Churn” is measured by subtracting 2007-2002 industry
product churn from 2012-2007 industry product churn. ”EXPORT Growth” is the 20012-2007 change in ln(exports)
by three digit industry cell. All columns include three digit industry dummies and controls for firm and plant size,
skills and ”noise” (plant manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview’s reliability score, day of the
week and duration, whether the survey was answered online or by mail).
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Table A8: Decentralization, Agency Costs and Financial Constraints
Table A11 - Decentralization and Financial Constraints
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable = Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.417*** 0.3506 0.5934 0.1752 0.2704 0.349** 0.4183***
(0.153) (0.76) (0.7893) (0.401) (0.38) (0.1585) (0.1532)
EXPORT Growth 0.0099 0.0095 0.0117 0.0099
(0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0122)
Decent*EXPORT Growth -0.0192* -0.0197* -0.0207** -0.0193*
(0.0106) (0.0109) (0.0103) (0.0107)
ABX exposure -0.4003* -0.3953
(0.2374) (0.2386)
Decent.*ABX exposure -0.0031 -0.0465
(0.2042) (0.2099)
Lehman exposure x x
x x
Decent.*Lehman exposure x x
x x
Lender health -0.0019 0.0126
(0.4597) (0.453)
Decent*Lender health 0.0001 0.0243
(0.3407) (0.3417)
Observations 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Controls
Firm & plant employment, skills Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cluster Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender Lender
U.S. Census Data (MOPS)
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered by the firm's primary lender. The dependent variable is the annualized 
three-year change of firm ln(sales) from 2009-06. Decentralization is measured in 2005. "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) by three digit industry cell 
between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). "Lender exposure to 
housing bubble" is the . "ABX exposure" is the correlation of the firm's lender's daily stock returns with the return on the ABX AAA 2006-H1 index, which follows the 
price mortgage-backed securities issued with a AAA rating. "Lender health" is an aggregation of lender balance sheet variables including trading account losses, real 
estate charge-offs, and the deposits to liabilities ratio.  We combine these variables into one lender health measure by normalizing each to have mean 0 and standard 
deviation 1, taking an average, and then normalizing this average to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1.  All columns include "noise controls" (plant manager's 
tenure and  hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and duration, whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant 
size are ln(employment) are skills is the ln(% of employees with a college degree).
Not : *s gnificant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated b OLS with standard rrors clustered by the firm’s
primary lender. The dependent variable is the annualized three-year change of firm ln(sales) from 2009-06. Decen-
tralization is measured in 2005. ”EXPORT Growth” is change in ln(exports) by three digit industry cell between
the 2008 and 2009 average (th main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest
pre-Recession years). ”Lender exposure to h using bubble” is the . ”ABX exposure” is the correlation of the firm’s
lender’s daily stock returns with the return on the ABX AAA 2006-H1 index, which follows the price mortgage-backed
securities issued with a AAA rating. ”Lender health” is an aggregation of lender balance sheet variables including
trading account losses, real estate charge-o↵s, and the deposits to liabilities ratio. We combine these variables into
one lender health measure by normalizing each to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1, taking an average, and then
normalizing this average to have mean 0 and standard deviation 1. All columns include ”noise controls” (plant man-
ager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview’s reliability score, day of the week and duration, whether
the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills is the ln(percentage
of employees with a college degree).
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Table A9: Is Decentralization Proxying for Coordination? WMS DataTable 9A - Is decentralization proxying for co-ordination? WMS Data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth
Decentralization 0.041 0.050 0.062 0.115 0.046 0.067 0.127 -0.013 0.361
(0.417) (0.418) (0.417) (0.422) (0.413) (0.419) (0.413) (0.448) (0.983)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.047** -0.047** -0.045** -0.046** -0.047*** -0.047** -0.050*** -0.046** -0.094**
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.047)
Ln(employees)*EXPORT Growth -0.940
(0.816)
Ln(plant employees) -0.228
(0.513)
Ln(plant employees)*EXPORT Growth 0.008
(0.021)
No. of production sites -0.003
(0.027)
No. of production sites*EXPORT Growth 0.003
(0.002)
Diversification 1.302
(0.898)
Diversification*EXPORT Growth 0.027
(0.055)
Multinational -2.478*
(1.384)
Multinational*EXPORT Growth 1.691
(1.730)
Foreign Multinational dummy -1.820**
(0.833)
Foreign Multinational*EXPORT Growth 0.016
(0.039)
Ln(share outsourced production) -0.090
(0.281)
Ln(share outsourced production)*EXPORT Growth 0.001
(0.012)
Materials Share -6.991
(7.065)
Materials Share*EXPORT Growth 0.817**
(0.357)
Observations 3,151 3,151 3,105 3,127 3,151 3,151 3,151 3,029 1,201
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty SIC3*Cty
Notes: Specifications are the same as Table 2 column (3) except augmented with additional variables (linear and interacted with export growth). Multinational =1 if the plant belongs to a
foreign or domestic multinational. Diversified =1 if the firm has multiple primary SIC4 codes. Share of outsourced production is a question in the WMS survey. Materials share is the
fraction of sales that are intermediate goods inputs (from ORBIS). 
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Specifications are the same as Table 2 column (3) except augmented
with additional variables (linear and interacted with export growth). Multinational =1 if the plant belongs to a
foreign or domestic multinational. Diversified =1 if the firm has multiple primary SIC4 codes. Share of outsourced
production is a question in the WMS survey. Materials share is the fraction of sales that are intermediate goods
inputs (from ORBIS).
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Table A10: Is Decentralization Proxying for Coordination? MOPS DataTable 9B - Is decentralization proxying for co-ordination? MOPS data
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Dependent Variable: Sales Growth 
Decentralization 0.570** 0.730*** 0.713*** -0.120 0.303 0.229 0.780*** 0.253 0.986***
(0.225) (0.242) (0.245) (0.749) (0.355) (0.323) (0.297) (0.307) (0.288)
Decentralization*EXPORT Growth -0.035** -0.031** -0.030** -0.032** -0.034** -0.033** -0.033** -0.031** -0.032**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Multiproduct -0.298
(0.583)
Multiproduct*EXPORT Growth 0.008
(0.035)
Ln(plant employment)*EXPORT Growth 0.003
(0.022)
Ln(firm employment)*EXPORT Growth 0.007
(0.010)
Ln(firm employment)*Decentralization 0.111
(0.094)
Ln(No. of plants) -0.530
(0.328)
Ln(No. of plants)*Decentralization 0.173
(0.143)
Ln(No. of states w/ plants) 0.040
(0.395)
Ln(No. of states w/ plants)*Decentralization 0.269*
(0.154)
Plant is in same state as largest plant 1.000*
(0.547)
Same state as largest plant*Decentralization -0.152
(0.349)
Ln(No. of manufacturing industries) -0.542*
(0.309)
Ln(No. of manufacturing industries)*Decentralization 0.352**
(0.146)
Plant is in same industry as largest plant 0.785
(0.520)
Same industry as largest plant*Decentralization -0.474
(0.369)
Observations 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774 8,774
Cluster SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3 SIC3
Notes: Specification are the same as Table 2 column (5). "Multiproduct" equals 1 if a plant produced at least two products (7-digit NAICS) in 2009 and 0 otherwise. "Ln(No. of
manufacturing industries)" is the log of the number of unique primary industry codes (6-Digit NAICS) assigned to the firm's manufacturing establishments in 2009. "Plant is in same state
as largest plant" equals 1 if plant is in the same U.S. state as the firm's largest plant by employment in 2009, and 0 otherwise. "Plant is in same industry as largest plant" is defined similarly
with an industry defined as 6-digit NAICS code. 
Notes: **significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Specification are the same as Table 2 column (5). ”Multiproduct”
equals 1 if a plant produced at least two products (7-digit NAICS) in 2009 and 0 otherwise. ”Ln(No. of manufacturing
industries)” is the log of the number of unique primary industry codes (6-Digit NAICS) assigned to the firm’s
manufacturing establishments in 2009. ”Plant is in same state as largest plant” equals 1 if plant is in the same U.S.
state as the firm’s largest plant by employment in 2009, and 0 otherwise. ”Plant is in same industry as largest plant”
is defined similarly with an industry defined as 6-digit NAICS code.
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Table A11: Changes in Decentralization
(1) (2)
World Management Survey U.S. Census Data
Dependent Variable
Change in Decentralization                   
(2010/2009 - 2006)
Change in 
Decentralization                   
(2010-2005)
EXPORT Growth -0.012** -0.001*
(0.006) (0.000)
Observations 222 8,774
Controls
Country Yes
Year Yes
Industry (SIC2) Yes Yes
Log firm and plant employment Yes Yes
Skills Yes Yes
Noise Yes Yes
Cluster SIC3*Cty SIC3
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit
industry by country level in column (1) and just industry in column (2). The dependent variable is the
2010/2009-2006 change in z-scored decentralization in column (1) and the 2010-2005 change in column
(2). "EXPORT Growth" is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008
and 2009 average (the main Great Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-
Recession years). All columns include two digit industry, country and year dummies and "noise controls"
(plant manager's tenure and hierarchical seniority and the interview's reliability score, day of the week and
duration, WMS also includes analyst dummies and MOPS whether the survey was answered online or by
mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills is the ln(% of employees with a college degree).
Notes: *significant at 10%; ** 5%; *** 1% level. Estimated by OLS with standard errors clustered at three-digit
industry by country level in column (1) and just industry in column (2). The dependent variable is the 2010/2009-
2006 change in z-scored decentralization in column (1) and the 2010-2005 change in column (2). ”EXPORT Growth”
is change in ln(exports) in country by three digit industry cell between the 2008 and 2009 average (the main Great
Recession years) compared to the 2006 and 2007 average (the latest pre-Recession years). All columns include two
digit industry, country and year dummies and ”noise controls” (plant manager’s tenure and hierarchical seniority
and the interview’s reliability score, day of the week and duration, WMS also includes analyst dummies and MOPS
whether the survey was answered online or by mail). Firm and plant size are ln(employment) are skills is the
ln(percentage of employees with a college degree).
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Table A12: Decentralization and Cross-Country Growth
Table A12 - Decentralization and Cross Country Growth
1 2 3 4 5 6
Decentrali
zation 
Index
Implied  
GDP 
Growth
  
France -0.357 -0.72 -0.453 0.24 -0.473 96%
GB 0.292 -0.28 -0.007 0.074 -0.64 1%
Germany 0.134 -0.39 -0.116 0.443 -0.271 43%
Greece -0.801 -1.03 -0.758 -5.438 -6.152 12%
Italy -0.242 -0.64 -0.374 -1.243 -1.957 19%
Japan -0.642 -0.92 -0.648 0.029 -0.685 95%
Poland -0.344 -0.71 -0.444 2.534 1.82 -24%
Portugal -0.264 -0.66 -0.389 -1.42 -2.134 18%
Sweden 0.544 -0.1 0.166 0.567 -0.147 -113%
US 0.303 -0.27 0.714
Average 1 -0.572 -0.336 -0.35 -1.182 16%
Notes: All GDP growth numbers in percentage points. Implied GDP growth in column (2) uses the coefficients on the
model of column (3) Table 2 combined with the value of decentralization from (1) and an assumed shock of 7.7% (the
empirical fall in aggregate US exports in the Great Recession as in our model). Actual GDP growth in column (4) is
taken from the World Bank market sector GDP series. Relative values in column (3) and (5) are the simple differences
from the US base. Sweden has a negative value in column (6) because it is the only country more decentralized than
US, but had a weaker GDP performance. Poland has a negative value because it had faster growth than the US despite
being more centralized (it is still in a catch up phase of growth). 
Difference in 
implied GDP 
growth relative 
to US
Actual annual 
average GDP 
growth (2012-
2008)
Difference in 
actual GDP 
growth relative to 
US
% of growth difference 
accounted for by 
Decentralization
Notes: All GDP growth numbers in percentage points. Implied GDP growth in column (2) uses the coe cients on
the model of column (2) Table 2 combined with the value of decentralization from (1) and an assumed shock of 7.7
percent (the empirical fall in aggregate US exports in the Great Recession as in our model). Actual GDP growth
in column (4) is taken from the World Bank market sector GDP series. Relative values in column (3) and (5) are
the simple di↵erences from the US base. Sweden has a negative value in column (6) because it is the only country
more decentralized than US, but had a weaker GDP performance. Poland has a negative value because it had faster
growth than the US despite being more centralized (it is still in a catch up phase of growth).
57
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers 
1478 Swati Dhingra 
Hanwei Huang 
Gianmarco I. P. Ottaviano 
João Paulo Pessoa 
Thomas Sampson 
John Van Reenen 
The Costs and Benefits of Leaving the EU: 
Trade Effects 
1477 Marco Bertoni 
Stephen Gibbons 
Olmo Silva 
What’s in a name? Expectations, heuristics 
and choice during a period of radical school 
reform 
1476 David Autor 
David Dorn 
Lawrence F. Katz 
Christina Patterson 
John Van Reenen 
Concentrating on the Fall of the Labor Share 
1475 Ruben Durante 
Paolo Pinotti 
Andrea Tesei 
 
The Political Legacy of Entertainment TV 
1474 Jan-Emmanuel De Neve 
George Ward 
 
Happiness at Work 
1473 Diego Battiston 
Jordi Blanes i Vidal 
Tom Kirchmaier 
 
Is Distance Dead? Face-to-Face 
Communication and Productivity in Teams 
1472 Sarah Flèche Teacher Quality, Test Scores and Non-
Cognitive Skills: Evidence from Primary 
School Teachers in the UK 
1471 Ester Faia 
Gianmarco Ottaviano 
 
Global Banking: Risk Taking and 
Competition 
1470 Nicholas Bloom 
Erik Brynjolfsson 
Lucia Foster 
Ron Jarmin 
Megha Patnaik 
Itay Saporta-Eksten 
John Van Reenen 
 
What Drives Differences in Management? 
1469 Kalina Manova 
Zhihong Yu 
 
Multi-Product Firms and Product Quality 
1468 Jo Blanden 
Kirstine Hansen 
Sandra McNally 
 
Quality in Early Years Settings and 
Children’s School Achievement 
1467 Joan Costa-Font 
Sarah Flèche 
 
Parental Sleep and Employment: Evidence 
from a British Cohort Study 
1466 Jo Blanden 
Stephen Machin 
 
Home Ownership and Social Mobility 
1465 Decio Coviello 
Stefano Gagliarducci 
 
Tenure in Office and Public Procurement 
1464 Claudia Olivetti 
Barbara Petrongolo 
 
The Economic Consequences of Family 
Policies: Lessons from a Century of 
Legislation in High-Income Countries 
1463 Claudia Hupkau 
Marion Leturcq 
 
Fertility and Mothers' Labor Supply: New 
Evidence Using Time-to-Conception 
1462 Clement Bellet The Paradox of the Joneses: Superstar Houses 
and Mortgage Frenzy in Suburban America 
1461 Georg Graetz 
Guy Michaels 
 
Is Modern Technology Responsible for 
Jobless Recoveries? 
1460 Thomas Breda 
Alan Manning 
Diversity and Social Capital within the 
Workplace: Evidence from Britain 
1459 Monica Langella 
Alan Manning 
 
Diversity and Neighbourhood Satisfaction 
1458 Giordano Mion 
Luca David Opromolla 
Alessandro Sforza 
 
The Diffusion of Knowledge via Managers’ 
Mobility 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel: +44 (0)20 7955 7673 Email info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Website: http://cep.lse.ac.uk Twitter: @CEP_LSE 
